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THE ETHICS OF EMPOWERMENT:
RETHINKING THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN
INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING
THE CHILD CLIENT
Katherine Hunt Federle*
"Then you should say what you mean," said the March Hare.
"I do," Alice hastily replied; "at least-at least I mean what I
say-that's the same thing, you know."
"Not the same thing a bit!" said the Hatter. "Why, you might
just as well say that 'I see what I eat' is the same thing as 'I eat what
I see'!"
"You might just as well say," added the March Hare, "that 'I
like what I get' is the same thing as 'I get what I like'!"
"You might just as well say," added the Dormouse, which
seemed to be talking in its sleep, "that 'I breathe when I sleep' is the
same thing as 'I sleep when I breathe'!"'
INTRODUCTION

L

AWYERS must feel, occasionally, that they have fallen down the
.Ljrabbit hole when they try to speak with and advise their clients.
This sensation may partially explain why issues of competency, coercion, and manipulation arise in the context of the lawyer's representation of the adult client. 2 Scholars have acknowledged that such
problems are the inevitable consequence of an unequal relationship in
* Associate Professor of Law, Tulane Law School.
1. Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventure in Wonderland, reprinted in More Annotated Alice 83 (Martin Gardner ed., 1990).
2. See, e.g., Douglas E. Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge? (1974)
(surveying various models of lawyer-client relationships and analyzing ethical issues
that arise in these models); Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practiceof Law As a Confidence Game: OrganizationalCoaptation of a Profession, Law & Soc'y Rev., June

1967, at 15, 22-31 (analyzing manipulation of client interests in context of criminal law

proceedings); Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice,and ProfessionalAutonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 503, 50405 (1985) (examining influence of ideal of autonomy on lawyer-client relationships in
large firm practice); Gary Neustadter, When Lawyer and Client Meet: Observations of
Interviewing and Counseling Behavior in the Consumer Bankruptcy Law Office, 35

Buff. L. Rev. 177 (1986) (analyzing lawyer-client relationships in consumer bank-

ruptcy law practices, focussing in particular on interviewing and counseling behavior);
Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 241, 278 n.291 (1992) (examining historical origins of the vision
of lawyers' role as representative of communitarian goals and analyzing the influence
of this vision on lawyer-client relationships); Austin Sarat & William Felstiner, Law
and Social Relations: Vocabulariesof Motive in Lawyer/Client Interaction,22 Law &
Soc'y Rev. 737 (1988) (examining how lawyers and clients interpret social conduct
involved in legal process of divorce).
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which the client is seen as subordinate and dependent.' Moreover,
the client may be particularly susceptible to interpersonal domination
because of invasive practices that systematically disempower the client.4 Client empowerment, therefore, becomes essential to the creation of an equal relationship between lawyer and client.
This question of empowerment is central to the lawyer's relationship with her child client. Furthermore, that relationship is inextricably linked to notions of client competency and lawyer autonomy. For
the child, an emphasis on capacity creates a peculiar disability, one
that suggests that the child may be unduly susceptible to coercion and
manipulation because of the child's inability to make reasoned decisions. Although these difficulties often underlie justifications that
deny the child access to counsel in the first instance, they also suggest
that the attorney's ethical obligations to the child client differ. Thus,
what the child wants may be subordinated to some vision of the child's
best interests and to what is a "good" or "right" decision. This necessarily enhances opportunities for autonomous decisionmaking by the
lawyer.
This emphasis on capacity has structured much of our discussion
about children's rights and ethical issues in interviewing and counseling child clients. The dominant lawyering paradigms, for example,
center on issues of client autonomy and lawyer independence, on who
gets to make decisions about the case. These models implicitly reflect
rights constructs that, ultimately, inform the lawyer about what she
may or may not do for the client. Moreover, rights theories themselves rest on some underlying notion about capacity as a prerequisite
to having and exercising rights. But because children are not seen as
capable, autonomous beings, much of our rights talk, and our lawyering, cannot accommodate children. What is needed is a new way of
thinking about rights and lawyering that will account for children as
rights holders.
This Article proposes a new lawyering model that stems from an
empowerment perspective on the rights of children. An empowerment perspective rejects capacity as an organizing principle in rights
theory and argues that power is central to any coherent account of
rights. From an empowerment perspective, it is the powerlessness of
children that mandates their empowerment. Moreover, ethical issues
in the representation of children would be resolved by considering the
child client's need for empowerment. Consequently, coercive and manipulative practices could no longer be justified and paternalistic practices would not only be inappropriate but unethical, for they would
have a disempowering effect on children as clients.

3. See infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
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The first section of this Article begins with an overview of the two
dominant lawyering paradigms and illustrates how theories of rights
structure the relationship between attorney and client. The Article
then analyzes the implications of these theories for lawyering when
the client is a child by considering the child's right to counsel in delinquency, abuse and neglect, and custody cases.5 Lawyering for the
child within the framework of these proceedings is then discussed and
interviewing and counseling techniques are reviewed. The Article
then concludes with a discussion of an empowerment perspective on
the rights of children and a suggestion as to how interviewing and
counseling the child client might differ under such an account.
I.

OF PROFESSIONAL ETmIcs, RIGHTS,

AND CHILDREN

Two competing visions of the good lawyer animate much of the discussion about professional ethics. The first is a paradigm of client autonomy, in which lawyering is client-centered and client-empowering;
the attorney is partisan, loyal, zealous, subordinate and morally
nonaccountable for the client's autonomous choices. 6 Dignity, freedom, individual autonomy and, somewhat paradoxically, communitarianism are central features.7 The second model emphasizes lawyer
autonomy: within this construct, the attorney is professionally independent of and, perhaps, even paternalistic towards the client, as
5. This article focusses on these proceedings because lawyers come into contact
with children most frequently in these sorts of cases. Nancy W. Perry & Larry L.
Teply, Interviewing, Counseling, and In-Court Examinationof Children: PracticalApproachesfor Attorneys, 18 Creighton L. Rev. 1369, 1370 n.14 (1985) (noting that lawyers come into contact with children most frequently in delinquency, neglect, abuse,
divorce, or tort cases); Marvin Ventrell, Rights & Duties: An Overview of the Attorney-Child Client Relationship, 26 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 259, 268 (1995) (stating that children are most commonly represented in abuse, neglect, dependency, delinquency, and
status offense cases).
6. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethics in the Practice of Law (1978)
(discussing the issues and conflicts that arise in the lawyer-client relationship); 1 Lawyers in Society: The Common Law World (Richard L. Abel & Philip S. C. Lewis eds.,
1988); Monroe H. Freedman, A Lawyer Doesn't Always Know Best, 7 Hum. Rts.,
Spring 1978, at 28, 52 (stating that legal advice is "indispensable ... to the effective
exercise of individual autonomy," and that lawyers should not deny clients their autonomy by preempting clients' moral choices); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend:
The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-ClientRelation, 85 Yale L. 1060, 1087 (1976)
(proposing a model for lawyer-client relationships in which the lawyer acts as the
client's legal friend and accords the client "special indulgences").
7. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, DisablingLawyers, 43 Hastings L.J.
769, 839 (1992) (recognizing that lawyers may empower their clients through such
tactics as personalization) [hereinafter Alfieri, Disabled Clients]; William L. F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: NegotiatingReality and Responsibility in
Lawyer-ClientInteractions,77 Cornell L. Rev. 1447, 1497 (1992) (acknowledging that
power is fluid and that clients exercise power over their lawyers in a number of ways);
Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Level Bureaucracy,43 Hastings L. 947, 951-54 (1992) (advocating a form of rebellious lawyering, in which the attorney seeks to empower subordinated clients) [hereinafter
Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering].
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well as morally accountable for her actions.8 In this instance, notions
of professional integrity are tied to larger concerns about the rights of
other clients and an overarching duty to the principles of truth and
justice.'

Neither account, however, goes deep enough to suggest a paradigm
that meaningfully addresses the seemingly intractable problems of
role and morality. This difficulty ultimately stems from an impoverished account of rights. Lawyering models implicitly engage in rights
talk: what the lawyer is to do (or not) for the client depends primarily
on how one constructs and values rights. But the accounts of rights
that lie beneath these lawyering models are invariably impoverished
because they fail to account for powerlessness. To be coherent, a theory of rights must recognize the connection between powerlessness,
hierarchy, and exclusion; in this sense, rights flow downhill toward the
least powerful in any given relationship.' 0 The difficulty with models
of professional ethics lies in their unsatisfactory accounts of rights and
explains, I think, the paradigmatic concern for the individual lawyer's
morality or goodness.
A. Two Lawyering Models
This section illustrates how two different notions of rights structure
models of lawyering. It begins with an overview of the client autonomy model and contends that the choice theory of rights best accounts
for the value placed on client autonomy. The Article then discusses
the critique of client autonomy and its alternative paradigm, the lawyer autonomy model. Interest theory, in which interests generate
rights and there is an explicit concern for the underlying moral justifications of a duty, best explains this emphasis on lawyer autonomy.
The section then concludes with a brief description of the implications
of these accounts for lawyering when the client is a child.
1. Client Autonomy Model
Client autonomy is the central value of the first lawyering model.
Within the simplest account of this paradigm, autonomy is seen as a
fundamentally moral concept, as a good in and of itself, because it
8. David Luban, Paternalismandthe Legal Profession,1981 Wis. L. Rev. 454,493
(1981) [hereinafter Luban, Paternalism]; Thomas L. Shaffer," Legal Ethics and the
Good Client, 36 Cath. U. L. Rev. 319, 329-30 (1987) [hereinafter Shaffer, Good
Client].
9. David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practiceof Law, 41 Vand.
L. Rev. 717, 737-40 (1988) (arguing that a morally activist vision of lawyering has
historical roots in a progressive professionalist view of legal profession) [hereinafter
Noblesse Oblige Tradition].
10. Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights In All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523, 1525-26
(1994); Katherine Hunt Federle, Rights flow downhill, 2 Int'l J. Children's Rts. 343,
343-45 (1994) [hereinafter Federle, Rights flow downhill].

1996]

ETHICS OF EMPOWERMENT

1659

promotes and secures individual dignity and freedom., Furthermore,
autonomy promotes individual happiness and satisfaction and, consequently, benefits society because it reaffirms those values promoted
by the liberal state.12 Finally, autonomy is inextricably linked to our
preference for an adversarial system of justice. It is being able to say
what one wants, to make one's case, to have some control over or to
influence 13 an outcome-that is the essence of autonomy and
freedom.
Under this model, the attorney is the systemic promoter and
facilitator of client autonomy. She has certain obligations to the client
necessitated by this role. They include duties of loyalty, partisanship,
zealous advocacy,'

4

and even a special-purpose friendship. 15 But

above all, the attorney must be professional, neutral with respect to
the ends sought, and nonaccountable to others for her part in the pursuit of the client's objectives, even when they may be wrong or immoral.' 6 Because autonomy is a moral good and the promotion of
autonomy depends, in large part, upon access to law, the attorney is
exempted from moral responsibility for the pursuit of the client's
stated ends.' 7 At worst, this renders the attorney's role amoral' 8 and
11. Anthony D'Amato & Edward J. Eberle, Three Models of Legal Ethics, 27 St.
Louis U. L. 761, 764 (1983); Fried, supra note 6, at 1074; Stephen L. Pepper, A
Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities,1986
Am. B. Found. Res. J. 613, 616-17; Robert S. Redmount, Paternalismand the Attorney-Client Relationship, 14 J. Legal Prof. 127, 132 (1989); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical
Perspectives on Legal Practice,37 Stan. L. Rev. 589, 605 (1985); Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy,
65 N.C. L. Rev. 315, 339 (1987). Monroe Freedman has been one of the most ardent
and articulate supporters of this position. Monroe H. Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics 57 (1990) [hereinafter Freedman, Ethics]; Freedman, supra note 6, at 31,
52; Monroe H. Freedman, PersonalResponsibility in a ProfessionalSystem, 27 Cath.
U. L. Rev. 191, 204 (1978) [hereinafter Freedman, PersonalResponsibility].
12. D'Amato & Eberle, supra note 11, at 764; Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisaland Refinement, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. 501, 547-52 (1990)
(discussing micro-arguments favoring a client-centered approach to legal counseling);
Strauss, supra note 11, at 338.
13. Hazard, supra note 6, at 129; D'Amato & Eberle, supra note 11, at 764-65;
David Luban, Partisanship,Betrayal andAutonomy in the Lawyer-ClientRelationship:
A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1004, 1035-37 (1990) [hereinafter
Luban, Partisanship](critiquing the "standard conception" of lawyering). For a more
comprehensive account of the Luban-Ellmann debate, see also Ellmann's review of
Luban's book, Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 116 (1990) (reviewing David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical
Study (1988)).
14. Freedman, Ethics, supra note 11, at 65-66.
15. Fried, supra note 6, at 1071-72. Fried analogizes the role of lawyer to that of a
limited-purpose friend who adopts the client's interests as her own within the context
of a (narrower) legal relationship.
16. Freedman, supra note 6, at 32-33; Fried, supra note 6, at 1082-87.
17. Pepper, supra note 11, at 617-18.
18. See id. at 617-19. For critiques of Pepper's claim that the lawyer's role is
amoral, see Andrew L. Kaufman, A Commentary on Pepper's "The Lawyer's Amoral
EthicalRole," 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 651; David Luban, The LysistratianPrerog-
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may promote moral nonaccountability, a central criticism of the client
autonomy paradigm. 19 '
Some proponents of the client autonomy model, however, claim
that the attorney's act is, in and of itself, a moral one.2 ° Proponents of
the paradigm argue that the lawyer acts morally when she helps clients
realize their legal rights.21 This sort of action insulates the attorney
from moral condemnation, even when she represents an "unworthy"
client, because it promotes the expression of client autonomy within
the legal system.22 The lawyer, nevertheless, may be held morally and
professionally accountable when she preempts client decision making
by denying the client the information or the means to carry out her
lawful purposes.23 This not only violates the client's right to pursue
her legal objectives2 4 but deprives the client of autonomous action, a
central value of this paradigm. 25
Moreover, under the client autonomy model, the attorney has an
additional obligation to ensure that the client participates freely and
autonomously within the attorney-client relationship itself. Because
the client accesses legal structures through the attorney, the client's
primary expression of autonomy occurs within the attorney-client relationship.2 6 Concerns about the paternalistic, manipulative, and even
deceptive practices of lawyers, however, suggest that client objectives
may be sacrificed to lawyer self-interest.2 7 Client-centered or participatory decision-making techniques counteract this tendency to
subordinate client interests by sensitizing the attorney to the ways in
which she may influence client decision making.28 Thus, by creating
ative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 637 [hereinafter
Luban, Lysistratian Prerogative];and Pepper's response, Stephen L. Pepper, A Rejoinder to Professors Kaufman and Luban, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 657.
19. See Freedman, Ethics, supra note 11, at 49-57; Fried, supra note 6, at 1074-75.
20. Freedman, Ethics, supra note 11, at 57; see Fried, supra note 6, at 1074; Freedman, supra note 6, at 52.
21. Fried, supra note 6, at 1075.
22. Freedman, Ethics, supra note 11, at 57; Freedman, supra note 6, at 52; Fried,
supra note 6, at 1074-75.
23. Freedman, Ethics, supra note 11, at 57; Freedman, supra note 6, at 52.
24. Fried, supra note 6, at 1075.
25. Freedman, Ethics, supra note 11, at 57; Freedman, supra note 6, at 52.
26. Dinerstein, supra note 12, at 514; Freedman, Personal Responsibility, supra
note 11, at 204; Fried, supra note 6, at 1073.
27. Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 659, 669 (1990); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Lying to Clients for Economic Gain or PaternalisticJudgment: A
Proposalfor a Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 761, 781-82 (1990) (responding to and expanding upon Lerman); see also Dinerstein, supra note 12, at 593
(arguing that lawyer-centered approach "contributes to the professional mystification
that persuades clients that the lawyer knows best").
28. Gary Bellow & Bea Moulton, The Lawyering Process: Ethics and Professional
Responsibility 1018-1104 (1981); David A. Binder & Susan C. Price, Legal Interviewing and Counseling: A Client-Centered Approach 147-48 (1977); Dinerstein, supra
note 12, at 555-56; Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 717, 720
(1987); Lerman, supra note 27, at 670; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 27, at 781-82.
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mechanisms to ensure the client's full participation in legal decision
making, participatory models enhance client autonomy. z9
This emphasis on client autonomy clearly presupposes a degree of
competency.30 If autonomy suggests the freedom to make choices
about and to control our lives, then being autonomous suggests having
the present capability to exercise such freedom. Furthermore, the
process of choosing implies that the decision maker is competent to
weigh the alternatives and to assess their consequences in a rational
and informed manner.31 Ascertaining when a decision is competent,
however, also provides greater opportunities for lawyer manipulation,
particularly if the attorney confuses a mistaken or poor decision for an
incompetent one.32 Even a presumption of competency, however,
would not preclude occasional infringements upon client33 decision
making when necessary to preserve the client's autonomy.
This vision of the autonomous and competent client comports with
Western rights traditions of individual liberty.3 4 Within a construct of
rights as the exercise of choice, the rights holder is an autonomous and
competent being with the power to compel others to perform some
duty owed to the rights holder.35 The performance of the duty, however, is conditioned upon the rights holder's decision to demand performance of the obligation; in other words, the right preexists the
duty.36 But the need to choose whether to enforce the obligation also
means that the rights holder must have the capacity to recognize that
a decision must be made and to execute that choice. Consequently,
capacity becomes a prerequisite to having and exercising rights.38
The client autonomy model also values the competent and autonomous rights holder. Rights not only provide access to the legal structure: they also define and preserve individual liberty. For a lawyer to
find a client incompetent is thus to declare that the client has no status
as a rights holder. 9 Client incompetency, therefore, authorizes the
29. Binder & Price, supra note 28, at 147-48; Douglas E. Rosenthal, Lawyer and
Client: Who's in Charge? 14 (1974); Ellmann, supra note 28, at 759-61.
30. See Ellmann, supra note 28, at 717, 726-29; Luban, supra note 8, at 462-64.
31. Id. at 727-28.
32. Id, at 769 & n.149. For a more complete understanding of Ellmann's position,
see John Morris's critique, John K. Morris, Power and Responsibility Among Lawyers
and Clients: Comment on Ellmann's Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 781
(1987); and Elman's rejoinder, Stephen Ellmann, Manipulation by Client and Context: A Response to ProfessorMorris, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1003 (1987).
33. See Ellmann, supra note 28, at 778.
34. Federle, Rights flow downhill, supra note 10, at 343.

35. Id. at 343-44; Jeremy Waldron, Introductionto Theories of Rights 1, 6 (Jeremy
Waldron ed., 1984).
36. Federle, Rights flow downhill, supra note 10, at 347-48.
37. Id. at 348.
38. Id. at 344.
39. Id. at 361-62; Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasionand Paternalism Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 515, 539 [hereinafter Tremblay, Lawyer Decisionmaking].
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attorney to act paternalistically and this sort of paternalism does not
infringe upon client autonomy when the client is not competent.40
Furthermore, paternalistic intervention may even appear to preserve
the client's opportunities for the future exercise of autonomy by
preventing the client from making choices that actually restrict
liberty.4 '
The centrality of capacity thus creates a special problem for proponents of participatory decision making because erroneous assessments
of the client's competence significantly impinge upon client autonomy.
Furthermore, the construct of competence may be used in ways which
disadvantage and disempower certain client groups, like the poor, particularly if their political or moral beliefs serve as a basis for assessing
the "rightness" or competence of their choices. 42 This image of the
client as incompetent and dependent, as "disabled,"'4 3 provides significant opportunities for the lawyer to exercise power at the expense of
client autonomy. 44 Existing legal structures also permit and perpetuate the image of client as incompetent other and create systemic occasions for disempowerment.45 In this way, the dominant vision of
competence narrows the client's exercise of autonomy to the politically permissible.46
Lawyering, nevertheless, may be a mechanism for significant individual and collective empowerment if we broaden our conception of
the autonomous, capable client. This would envision enabling the client within the attorney-client relationship to resist attorney domination by enhancing client participation and encouraging collaboration
through new methods of interviewing, counseling, and investigation.47
By freeing the client from a legal hegemony designed to perpetuate
unequal class structures, this account also would permit the client to
challenge the subordinating systemic effects of law and to consider
long-term rewards.' Client empowerment, in turn, promotes class
40. See Luban, Paternalism,supra note 8, at 465-66.

41. See id. at 465.
42. Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic

Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. L. & Soc. Change 659, 665 (1987-88) [hereinafter Alfieri,
Antinomies of Poverty Law]; Ellmann, supra note 28, at 770-71; see also Tremblay,
Lawyer Decisionmaking,supra note 39, at 538-39 (discussing the role of the lawyer
whose client appears to be incompetent).
43. See Alfieri, Disabled Clients, supra note 7, at 773.
44. Tremblay, Lawyer Decisionmaking,supra note 39, at 554; see Alfieri, Disabled
Clients, supra note 7, at 811-12; Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 7, at 1449-50.
45. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, supra note 7, at 812-15.
46. Id. at 811-12.
47. Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: LearningLessons of
Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2147 (1991).

48. Alfieri, Antinomies of Poverty Law, supra note 42, at 711-12; Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, supra note 7, at 959. Alfieri argues that the dominant traditions in
poverty lawyering (direct service and law reform litigation) cannot and will not succeed in abolishing poverty because these traditions depoliticize the struggle against
poverty. Rather, the goal of lawyering for the poor should be the mobilization and
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consciousness and facilitates collectivist strategies for positive and
long-term legal change.49 This vision of client empowerment thus fosters both individuality and collectivity: the freedom to express personal goals to the lawyer and the power to effect long-term change
through political communitarian agitation.50
Although this version of client empowerment offers a different accounting of rights, client autonomy is nevertheless a central value.
Unlike the vision of rights articulated by the simple autonomy model,
this theory reconstructs rights to accommodate notions of both individual and class rights. 5 By pursuing the individual claim within a
case-specific context while empowering the client to agitate for rights
vindicating the client's class interests, the attorney combines these disparate objectives into a unified, multidimensional theory of rights.52
But this emphasis on transcendent class rights does not obviate autonomy as a primary-goal of client empowerment lawyering for the client
has the freedom to choose among various rights demands and the attorney is obligated to respect those client choices.53 Furthermore, and
somewhat counterintuitively, class consciousness facilitates autonomy
by freeing individuals from subordinating structures and practices and
thereby enhancing individual dignity while recognizing the advantages
of community.
2. Lawyer Autonomy Model
Proponents of the competing lawyering paradigm, however, claim
that the client empowerment model does not adequately account for
the powerful client. The corporate lawyer, for example, often serves
wealthy and socially powerful clients upon whom she may depend for
recurring business; consequently, she may be reluctant or unable to
empowerment of the poor as a class to enable effective collective challenges to oppressive welfare systems. Alfieri, Antinomies of Poverty Law, supra note 42, at 663-

65.

49. See Alfieri, Antinomies of Poverty Law, supra note 42, at 711-12 (arguing that
poverty can be abolished only through the unification of the poor as a class and that
lawyers must facilitate this process by transforming the attorney-client relationship);
see also Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, supra note 7, at 957-58 (discussing one
strand of empowerment theoretic-the "collectivist" theme-in which mobilization is
an effective method for clients to redress their grievances).
50. Alfieri, Antinomies of Poverty Law, supra note 42, at 711; Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, supra note 7, at 958 (discussing view urging attorneys to encourage
collective activity among the poor in order to achieve long-term community goals).
For a summary of the modern and postmodern views of lawyering, see Anthony V.
Alfieri, Stances, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1233 (1992).
51. Alfieri, Antinomies of Poverty Law, supra note 42, at 701.
52. Id. Alfieri argues that traditional methods of poverty lawyers continue to have
a place in poverty lawyering and that the lawyer should respect the client's limited
rights demand. Nevertheless, the lawyer should engage the client in a dialogue about
the possibilities of transcendent and comprehensive rights demands.
53. Id
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challenge stated client objectives.5 4 Organizational constraints imposed by a large-firm practice setting or the role as in-house counsel
to a corporation suggest additional diminutions in lawyer power. 5
Furthermore, the lawyer's willingness to defer when confronted by a
powerful client is particularly problematic because the powerful client
is more likely to be in a position to harm third persons. 6 Even the
merely savvy or sophisticated client, who may have a clear sense of
how to accomplish certain objectives, is unlikely to feel overwhelmed
by or act unduly deferential to the attorney.

7

The critique of client empowerment also rejects the claim that zealous advocacy and partisanship promote the values of individual dignity and autonomy. While the justification for adversariness has great
force when applied to criminal proceedings, not all cases handled by
lawyers are criminal cases. 8 In the civil context, the lawyer may be
representing a powerful client for whom the traditional appeals to autonomy and freedom from oppression are exceedingly inappropriate.59 But even within the criminal context, systemic interests in
uncovering the truth and in promoting fairness place limitations upon
zealous advocacy and client loyalty. 60 Furthermore, much of what
lawyers do-negotiating, counseling, settling-occurs outside the adversarial system and without an independent arbiter6 ' and, in some
instances (as with much transactional work), in the absence of an
identifiable opponent.
Under this view, the adversary system excuses lawyers from moral
accountability for the harm caused to third parties by the facilitation
of client objectives. 62 Adversariness, according to its critics, exonerates role-differentiated behavior: the lawyer may engage in certain
acts on behalf of the client, acts which would be immoral if done for
54. John P. Heinz, The Power of Lawyers, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 891, 899 (1983).
55. Id. at 900; Rhode, supra note 11, at 631-38.
56. Morris, supra note 32, at 799.
57. Id. at 798.
58. Robert M. Bastress, Client Centered Counselingand Moral Accountabilityfor
Lawyers, 10 J. Legal Prof. 97, 115-16 (1985); Erwin Chemerinsky, ProtectingLawyers
From Their Profession: Redefining the Lawyer's Role, 5 J. Legal Prof. 31, 38-39
(1980); Morris, supra note 32, at 796; Rhode, supra note 11, at 606; Ted Schneyer,
Moral Philosophy's StandardMisconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 1529,
1540; Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Hum.
Rts., Fall 1975, at 1, 12.
59. Rhode, supra note 11, at 606-08.
60. Richard K. Burke, "Truth in Lawyering" An Essay on Lying and Deceit in the
Practiceof Law, 38 Ark. L. Rev. 1, 16-17 (1984); D'Amato & Eberle, supra note 11, at
767-68; Morris, supra note 32, at 789-90.
61. Burke, supra note 60, at 12-13; Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalismand
Accountability of Lawyers, 66 Cal. L. Rev. 669, 671 (1978).
62. David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in The Good Lawyer 83, 84
(David Luban ed., 1983) [hereinafter Luban, Adversary System Excuse]; Morris, supra
note 32, at 788-89; see Luban, Partisanship,supra note 13, at 1018-21.
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others outside the attorney-client relationship.6 3 The legal profession
nevertheless protects role-differentiated behavior through the promulgation of ethical codes that promote moral nonaccountability as a necessary adjunct to adversariness. 64 But, as the critics point out,
adversariness cannot be justified across a range of cases or the spectrum of lawyering situations, leaving role-differentiated behavior with
little moral force.65 Consequently, critics of the client autonomy
model contend that the lawyer has broader obligations and may be
held morally accountable to the same extent as a nonlawyer for the
harms caused to others.66
Whether a good lawyer also may be a good person is an important
issue for proponents of the lawyer autonomy model.67 The obligations of the professional role, imposed by a paradigm in which client
autonomy is a central value, may not only insulate the attorney systemically from responsibility but also discourage the attorney's direct
and personal examination of the moral implications of her actions.68
Furthermore, to ignore the moral aspect of professional life denies the
essential nature of law office talk, in which attorney and client engage
in a moral conversation that, at its best, reflects mutual interdependence and caring. 69 Encouraging the moral independence of lawyers
promotes goodness by thinking about the morals of others 70 and pro-

63. Schwartz, supra note 61, at 673; Wasserstrom, supra note 58, at 3.
64. Luban, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 62, at 84; Gerald J.Postema,
Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 63, 73 (1980);
Schneyer, supra note 58, at 1533-34; Schwartz, supra note 61, at 672-73; William H.
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and ProfessionalEthics, 1978
Wis. L. Rev. 29, 36-37.
65. Luban, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 62, at 117. Luban argues that
while adversariness may be justifiable in criminal or quasi-criminal cases because we'
have political reasons for handicapping the state and the criminal defendant appears
to be the paradigmatic "man in trouble," adversariness cannot be justified in noncriminal cases. According to Luban, adversariness has little moral force. Thus, lawyers
must have some additional moral justification for their actions other than the adversary system. Il at 117-18.
66. Luban, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 62, at 118; Luban, Partisanship,
supra note 13, at 1005; Peter Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That?": AttorneyClient DeliberationRegardingNonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C.
L. Rev. 213, 223-24 (1990); Thomas D. Morgan, Thinking About Lawyers as Counselors, 42 Fla. L. Rev. 439, 454 (1990); Morris, supra note 32, at 794; Rhode, supra note
11, at 643-44; Wasserstrom, supra note 58, at 12.
67. Thomas L. Shaffer, On Thinking Theologically About Lawyers As Counselors,
42 Fla. L. Rev. 467, 468 (1990).
68. Postema, supra note 64, at 73-81; Rhode, supra note 11, at 626; Wasserstrom,
supra note 58, at 12-13.
69. Warren Lehman, The Pursuitof a Client's Interest,77 Mich. L. Rev. 1078, 1079
(1979); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse,55 Notre Dame
Law. 231, 231-32 (1979) [hereinafter Shaffer, Moral Discourse].
70. Shaffer, Moral Discourse, supra note 69, at 252; Shaffer, Good Client, supra
note 8, at 319.
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duces happier and more productive attorneys. 7 Ethical discretion
also fosters a more just legal system; the lawyer may confront the client about the moral implications of the client's actions and actively
seek justice by pursuing only those objectives deemed right and fair.7"
Proponents of moral independence accord the attorney considerable autonomy over both the means chosen and the ends pursued on
behalf of a client. 73 While the moral lawyer may refuse to engage in
any proposed course of conduct that violates her conscience, she nevertheless must accept responsibility for those actions she chooses to
undertake for the client. 74 Irrespective of the client's legal right to
pursue her objectives, 75 the attorney must make judgments about the
moral implications of the client's goals that are grounded either in the
lawyer's own moral understanding76 or in some sense of common morality, a concept less difficult to apply in practice than may first appear.7 7 Such assessments necessitate a moral conversation between
lawyer and client to ascertain the client's wishes and reconcile any
conflicts between the lawyer's moral judgments and the client's aims
and to counsel the client about the rightness or wrongness of her actions.78 Although such counseling may be explicitly client-centered in
that it seeks only to enlighten and persuade,79 it also opens discourse
to the possibilities of the client's moral conversion. 80
Because a morally activist vision of lawyering exhorts lawyers to
shape and judge client objectives,81 it necessarily encourages certain
paternalistic practices.8n The notion of lawyer as moral counselor is
not new to the bar:83 the Brandeisian concept of the "lawyer for the
situation" envisions the attorney as actively engaged in the improve71. Bastress, supra note 58, at 118. Chemerinsky argues that lawyers should not
take positions counter to their own personal beliefs because of the possibility that
such advocacy may actually force a change in the lawyers' own beliefs. Chemerinsky,
supra note 58, at 34.
72. Bastress, supra note 58, at 117; William H. Simon, EthicalDiscretion in Lawyering, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1083, 1090-91 (1988).
73. Bastress, supra note 58, at 113; Luban, Partisanship,supra note 13, at 1005.
74. Burke, supra note 60, at 22; Luban, Partisanship,supra note 13, at 1021-22;
Rhode, supra note 11, at 643.
75. Rhode, supra note 11, at 644.
76. Bastress, supra note 58, at 114.
77. Luban, Partisanship,supra note 13, at 1023; Wasserstrom, supra note 58, at 1011.
78. Bastress, supra note 58, at 99-103; Luban, Partisanship,supranote 13, at 1022,
1026; Margulies, supra note 66, at 221-27 (discussing a model for counseling clients
about moral implications of actions); Morgan, supra note 66, at 456; Shaffer, Moral
Discourse,supra note 69, at 235.
79. Bastress, supra note 58, at 128; Luban, Partisanship,supra note 13, at 1026;
Morgan, supra note 66, at 456.
80. Shaffer, Moral Discourse,supra note 69, at 247.
81. Luban, Noblesse Oblige Tradition, supra note 9, at 738.
82. See Luban, Partisanship,supra note 13, at 1036-37 & n.109.
83. Id. at 1014.
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ment of both law and client.' Nor is the profession, unaware of the
ways in which lawyers may act independently of their clients. For example, courts have upheld lawyers' decisions to override their clients'
preferences in tactical matters and the legal profession has sanctioned
lawyer decision making in other instances as well. 5 The bar's willingness to sanction paternalistic practices suggests that acting on the client's behalf, even when contrary to the client's expressed wishes, may
be better for the client and, therefore, create a positive moral good.
In justification of these infringements upon client decision making,
proponents of a morally activist ideal of lawyering contend that the
client autonomy model exaggerates both the extent to which lawyers
actually impinge upon client autonomy and the value of autonomy
itself.8 6 The most significant interference with a client's autonomy occurs when the lawyer refuses to accept a case or continue with the
representation, yet this hardly affects the client's autonomy because of
the other opportunities the client has for independent action. s 7 It may
also be extremely difficult to distinguish between an autonomous
choice and a paternalistic one because, in practice, an autonomous
decision often appears consonant with the client's best interests.8 8
Furthermore, the client autonomy model values the autonomous act
over acting autonomously;8 9 taken to its logical extreme, this elevates
autonomous action to a good, even when the results of that action
would be immoral. 90 But as autonomy itself has little, if any, inherent
worth, refusing to further the client's immoral purposes cannot be
morally objectionable simply because it impinges upon client
autonomy. 9 '
84. Luban, Noblesse Oblige Tradition,supra note 9, at 721 (recounting a speech
made by Justice Brandeis at Harvard in which Brandeis argued that the lawyer should
engage in law reform and exhort her clients to act in the public good). Russell Pearce
argues that the lawyer's obligation to pursue the common good, even when it conflicted with the client's or the lawyer's interests, may be traced to an even earlier

source-an essay written by a nineteenth century jurist. This essay, argues Pearce,
influenced subsequent national codifications of the lawyer's ethical obligations. Russell Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Originsof the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 Geo. J.

Legal Ethics 241 (1992).
85. Luban, Paternalism,supra note 8, at 458-60.
86. Luban, Lysistratian Prerogative,supra note 18, at 643 (noting that limited impositions do not threaten clients' autonomy given the clients' other opportunities for
decision making); Luban, Partisanship,supra note 13, at 1037 (finding no intrinsic
value to autonomy).
87. Luban, Lysistratian Prerogative,supra note 18, at 639.
88. William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50
Md. L. Rev. 213, 226 (1991).
89. Luban, LysistratianPrerogative,supra note 18, at 639. Luban argues that while
it may be good that people may make their own choices, it does not necessarily mean
that what they choose to do is good. Thus, autonomy cannot be preferred over good
or right conduct.
90. See id.; Shaffer, Good Client, supra note 8, at 328.
91. D'Amato & Eberle, supra note 11, at 773 (arguing that "moral rules cannot be
eclipsed by nonmoral considerations" thus encouraging a move away from autonomy
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Nevertheless, not all infringements upon client autonomy are morally permissible. 92 Autonomy may not have any intrinsic goodness,
but it is a means of promoting other values like responsibility. 93 To
have responsibility means to have the freedom to exercise choice but
in a manner that suggests the individual act in accordance with moral
principles.94 While the freedom to choose encompasses even mere
whims, its value lies not in the individual's ability to make choices but
inthe decision to act morally.95 If the autonomous action can be said
the client's choice would be an unto be responsible, then restricting
96
paternalism.
of
act
justifiable
Autonomy in this narrower sense apparently welcomes moral discourse between lawyer and client. 97 Making moral decisions does not
occur in isolation and implies that the client is willing to receive moral
influence and correction. 98 The moral advisor necessarily must have
has
integrity if she wishes for her advice to be followed; the lawyer
9 9 The
client.
her
for
do
not
will
she
things
integrity if there are certain
conversation between lawyer and client thus facilitates moral decision
making by opening the client to the ethical possibilities of his actions' 00 and even to conversion. 01 ' But condemning this practice as
paternalistic necessarily misconstrues the value of paternal metaphors
to the practice of law,10 for being paternalistic resonates with moral
worth.'0 3
This vision of lawyering, which is explicitly Kantian,' °4 suggests a
different approach to understanding individual rights. Within such an
account, a right is an interest that the legal or ethical system recognizes as worthy of advancement or protection by imposing duties on
.others.° Rights, therefore, are not correlative to duties and this has
the advantage of permitting one to say that another has a right withand not a move toward a socialist model of professional responsibility in which lawyer
acts as an agent for the state); Luban, Partisanship,supra note 13, at 1037-38; Shaffer,
Good Client, supra note 8, at 328.
92. Luban, Paternalism,supra note 8, at 474; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 27, at
767-74 (suggesting that withholding information from the client may be permissible
only in some circumstances).
93. Luban, Partisanship,supra note 13, at 1037-38.

94. Id. at 1038-39.
95. Id.

96. Id.
97. Shaffer, Moral Discourse,supra note 69, at 246

98. Id.
99. Shaffer, Good Client, supra note 8, at 329-30.
100. Shaffer, Moral Discourse, supra note 69, at 246-47.
101. Id. at 247.

102. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 Tex. L. Rev.
963, 987 (1987).
103. Id.

104. Luban, Partisanship,supra note 13, at 1038; Shaffer, Moral Discourse, supra
note 69, at 246.
105. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places, supra note 10, at 1531;
Waldron, supra note 35, at 10.
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out having to identify who has the duty."°6 Questions pertaining to
the nature of the duty and the identity of the obligor are addressed by
a substantive account of which interests generate rights. 0 7 *Ofcourse,
not every interest will generate a corresponding fight, but an interest
theory may accommodate a 08larger class of fights and rights holders
than would a choice theory.
Furthermore, interest theory permits one to consider not simply the
interests of the fights holder but also of the duty bearer when justifying the imposition of fights and obligations. 0 9 References to individual autonomy thus cannot begin to explain why one's interests should
be exchanged for another's or for some moral principle." 0 A conception of political morality nevertheless requires some explanation of
the trade-off."' The process of justification implies that the individual, whose interests are affected, may be reasoned with by those proffering the explanation." 2 This suggests two interrelated concepts
about capacity and interests: the individual must have the capacity to
apprehend moral reasoning
and those interests central to capacity
1 3
must remain intact'
Moral discourse thus involves a conversation between two individuals capable of understanding moral argument, of giving and receiving
moral advice." 4 But would the client's lack of moral competence obviate the need for a moral conversation? The question is an important
one, for an affirmative answer would indicate that the attorney may
justifiably treat the incapacitated client differently. Furthermore, a
determination that the client is incompetent would countenance the
lawyer's paternalism.
How, then, from within this perspective, should the client's capacity
be ascertained? Respect for the client's autonomy implies that eccentric or peculiar decisions do not necessarily denote incapacity."15 But
an incompetent client cannot be said to be autonomous because she
lacks the capacity to engage in rational decision making." 6 A finding
106. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places, supra note 10, at 1531;

Waldron, supra note 35, at 10.
107. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places, supra note 10, at 1531.

108. Id.; Waldron, supra note 35, at 12.
109. Waldron, supra note 35, at 12-13. To distinguish right-based from duty-based
theories, Waldron uses the example of torture. Under a right-based theory, torture is
prohibited out of a concern for the sufferings of those who are tortured. But under a
duty-based theory, torture is prohibited because it degrades the torturer. Id. at 13.
110. Id. at 19-20.
111. Id. at 19.
112. Id. at 19-20.
113. Katherine Hunt Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A
Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 983, 1000-01
(1993); Waldron, supra note 35, at 20.

114. Shaffer, Moral Discourse,supra note 69, at 248-50.
115. See Luban, Paternalism,supra note 8, at 466 (discussing "a notion of incompetence that is not self-justifying and self-serving").
116. Id. at 465.
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of incompetency, therefore, must be based upon some factual account
of how the individual came to be incompetent or a judgment that the
basis for the client's choices cannot be inferred from the available
facts." 7 If the client could not satisfy this test of her rationality, the
lawyer would be justified in making decisions for the client.",
When that client is a child, capacity becomes a central issue because
119
we lack any definitive statement about the competency of children.
There is, nevertheless, a strong presumption that children are not
competent beings and have not yet reached that level of moral development that would enable them to participate in a moral conversation.120 Even if the child has certain interests that can be said to
generate rights, that substantive account invariably emphasizes the
child's needs and dependencies.' 21 Proponents of the lawyer autonthe
omy model, when they have addressed the issue at all, imply 1that
child, simply by virtue of her age, lacks the requisite capacity. 22 Certainly, the child's incompetency would warrant paternalistic
intervention. 2 3
Acting paternalistically when the client is a child would seemingly
be justifiable even under the client autonomy model.'24 Although this
construct values individual rights, it presupposes a rights holder who is
capable of making decisions. This connection between competency
and rights constrains our rights talk about children because of their
perceived incapacities. If children are not autonomous beings, then it
is difficult to see how a lawyering model that values client decisionmaking would have any applicability in the case of a child client. Despite the deep skepticism about individual rights from a
communitarian perspective,' 25 client autonomy remains a central
value because of its connection to greater political empowerment.
117. Id at 479, 482. Luban argues that we may override a person's choices on behalf of that person's own good only if we have some causal account explaining how
that person came to be incompetent or if that individual cannot be said to have engaged in some inferential process based on real facts before making her choice.
118. Id at 482. Luban identifies four different conceptions of paternalism: "1) constraining, on behalf of [one's] values, one's liberty to act according to [one's] values;
2) ... constraining, on behalf of [one's] values, [one's] liberty to do what [one] wants;
3) ... constraining, in [one's] own best interests, [one's] liberty to act according to
[one's] values; 4) ... constraining, in [one's] own best interests, [one's] liberty to do
what [one] wants." Id at 472. According to Luban, paternalistic actions are not justifiable when the paternalist overrides one's real values. To permit this sort of paternalism would allow an attack upon one's integrity. Id at 473-74.
119. Federle, Rights flow downhill, supra note 10, at 348 n.35.
120. Id. at 347-49.
121. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places,supranote 10, at 1531-32.
122. Luban, Paternalism,supra note 8, at 490 (stating that "not at all clear that the
13-year-old is capable of making such a far-reaching decision"); Shaffer, Moral Discourse, supra note 69, at 250 (noting that "[p]arents give; children receive").
123. See Luban, Paternalism,supra note 8, at 493; Wasserstrom, supranote 58, at 19
(explaining that acting paternalistically is to treat someone like a child).
124. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, a notion of empowerment tied to a strong account of
rights seems to hold the greatest promise for constructing a lawyering
model that would account for the child client.
II.

LAWYERING AND THE CHILD CLIENT

The centrality of capacity to rights theory raises two difficult, interrelated questions about a lawyering paradigm that would accommodate the child client. The first lies in constructing a child's right to
counsel. Seemingly, a child would fall entirely outside the class of
rights holders because of her incapacities and, therefore, could not
even claim such a right. But even if a child has a right to counsel
despite her incompetencies, then what role would the lawyer play?
Could a lawyer for a child ever be a zealous advocate or is her role
like that of a wise and understanding parent?
Central to the resolution of these issues is the idea of autonomy and
the inherent tension between client decision making and lawyer independence. This section of the Article illustrates these issues by providing an overview of the literature on models of lawyering for the
child client. The section begins with a discussion of the child's right to
counsel primarily in three types of proceedings: delinquency, abuse
and neglect, and divorce custody. This Section focusses on the role of
the lawyer representing the child client and analyzes that role in terms
of the two competing lawyering paradigms discussed in the previous
section. The relationship between models of lawyering and interviewing and counseling the child client is then examined in terms of underlying notions about autonomy and capacity.
A.

Counsel for the Child in Delinquency Proceedings

Prior to 1967, the question of whether a child was entitled to counsel as a matter of constitutional law was unresolved.'26 Much of the
debate centered on the nature of and justifications for a separate judicial system to handle the problems of delinquent, dependent, and neglected children. From an historical perspective, the juvenile court
system was seen as an integral part of the child welfare movement and
was concerned primarily with the protection and rehabilitation of
wayward youth. 127 Because its purpose was to reform, rather than to
punish, the juvenile court rejected the philosophy of the criminal court
and eschewed traditional legal trappings like procedural formality. 28
126. The United States Supreme Court decided In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), in
that year. Until that time, children in delinquency proceedings had no constitutional
right to be represented by court-appointed counsel.
127. Anthony Platt & Ruth Friedman, The Limits of Advocacy: Occupational
Hazards in Juvenile Court, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1156, 1158-59, & n.16 (1968).
128. Id. at 1159-61.
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a setting designed to benefit chilThere was little need for counsel in 29
dren and foster their development.1
Furthermore, the traditional lawyer's role, with its emphasis on the
zealous protection of individual rights, seemed peculiarly unsuitable
to the unique goals of the juvenile justice system. 130 The lawyer was
not a vigorous advocate of civil and constitutional rights and was
"missing the whole point" if she sought to secure the release of a child
who had committed the act alleged.' 3 ' Counsel who insisted on procedural formality and the protection of rights could find herself facing a
the
hostile and unsympathetic judge who might threaten to waive
32 If the
adversariness.
in
her
persisted
counsel
if
court
adult
to
child
child did have counsel, however, h~r role was that of guardian and
officer of the court. The lawyer was to interpret the philosophy of the
juvenile justice system to the child and to assist in the minor's rehabili33
tation by insuring the child's cooperation with the court's orders.
Some commentators, however, were deeply skeptical of the juvenile
court's rehabilitative ideal. These critics noted that the benevolent
practices of the juvenile court often masked harsh and punitive sanctions. 34 For example, children could be detained before trial in adult
jails and lock-ups and, upon an adjudication, could be committed to
secure facilities resembling adult penal institutions often for longer
periods of time than would have been possible had they been convicted of a crime.' 35 Furthermore, the process of adjudicating a child
as delinquent often had stigmatizing effects not unlike those associated with criminal convictions.' 36 The distinction between the juvenile and criminal courts, therefore, was not a meaningful one and the
129. See id.
130. See Robert E. Furlong, The Juvenile Court and the Lawyer, 3 J. Far. L. 1, 24-

25 (1963).
131. David A. McMullan, The Lawyer's Role in the Juvenile Court, Prac. Law., Apr.
1962, at 49, 52; see Furlong, supra note 130, at 24-25; William B. McKesson, Right to
Counsel in Juvenile Proceedings, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 843, 846 (1961).
132. McKesson notes the following:

There were a few rare instances in which the lawyer insisted that his client be

treated in much the same way that he would be in a criminal court, and that

his client's "rights" made it necessary for the lawyer to demand that strict

rules of evidence should be followed. One effective way of meeting this contention was to suggest that if he or his client wanted a criminal trial, it would

be necessary for the juvenile court to transfer the case to the criminal court
.... This suggestion usually'brought a change in the attitude of belligerent
counsel.
McKesson, supra note 131, at 846.
133. d; see McMullan, supra note 131, at 54.

134. Chester J. Antieau, ConstitutionalRights in Juvenile Courts, 46 Cornell L.Q.
387, 387-91 (1961); Monrad G. Paulsen, Fairnessto the Juvenile Offender, 41 Minn. L.
Rev. 547, 550 (1957); Platt & Friedman, supra note 127, at 1160; Note, Rights and

Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 281, 281 (1967).
135. Antieau, supra note 134, at 387, 390.

136. Platt & Friedman, supra note 127, at 1160-61.
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constitutional requisites of due process mandated
certain procedural
1 37
protections, including the right to counsel.
Nevertheless, the role of counsel for the child was constrained by
the rehabilitative underpinnings of the juvenile court. Although some
commentators acknowledged the need for a lawyer to zealously defend her child client, her adversariness was to be tempered with an
understanding of the juvenile court's welfare orientation. 38 The
child's attorney was to be flexible and to adjust to the special needs of
the court while avoiding the indiscriminate use of adversarial techniques.' 39 Additionally, the lawyer was to serve as "wise parent" by
considering the child's welfare, as interpreter to the child of the
court's objectives, and as facilitator of an acceptable and beneficial
disposition."4 Some, however, doubted the ability and commitment
of the legal profession to temper its approach to adversarial representation and claimed4 that children would be better served by nonprofessional advocates.' '

Concerns about the lawyer's overzealous representation of the child
client had been overstated. Studies indicated that the minor's lawyer
was often unprepared at trial' 42 and frequently stipulated to the
facts. 143 Furthermore, the attorney often failed to recognize the potential for a conflict of interest when retained by the parents to represent the child,"4 particularly when the child's behavior might be
attributable to neglectful parenting. 45 The zealous lawyer also could
expect some pressure from the bench to conform to the nonadversarial and informal nature of juvenile proceedings. 46 Juvenile court
judges indicated in several surveys that the role of the lawyer was not
exclusively an adversarial one and many suggested that the lawyer
needed special training beyond trial advocacy.' 47
The question whether the child had a right to counsel in juvenile
proceedings was partially answered by the United States Supreme
137. Platt & Friedman, supra note 127, at 1161 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41
(1967)); see Antieau, supra note 134, at 392-93; Joel F. Handler, The Juvenile Court
and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. Rev. 7, 13;
Paulsen, supra note 134, at 550.
138. Jacob L. Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New
Family Court, 12 Buff. L. Rev. 501, 506 (1963); see Junius L. Allison, The Lawyer and
His Juvenile Court Client, 12 Crime & Delinq. 165, 169 (1966).
139. Allison, supra note 138, at 169; Isaacs, supra note 138, at 506.
140. Isaacs, supra note 138, at 506-07.
141. See Handler, supra note 137, at 37-40.
142. Note, Rights and Rehabilitationin the Juvenile Courts,supra note 134, at 324.
143. Id. at 326-27.
144. Daniel L. Skoler & Charles W. Tenney, Jr., Attorney Representationin Juvenile
Court, 4 J. Fam. L. 77, 90-91 (1964).
145. Glenn C. Equi et al., Comment, In re Gault: Understanding the Attorney's
New Role, 12 Vill. L. Rev. 803, 814. (1967).
146. McKesson, supra note 131, at 846; see Equi et al., supra note 145, at 814.
147. Skoler & Tenney, supranote 144, at 93; Equi et al., supra note 145, at 814.
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Court in 1967 when it decided In re Gault."4 The Court held that due
process mandates the child's representation by counsel in a proceeding to determine delinquency where the child's freedom may be curtailed by commitment to an institution. 49 The Court's decision,
however, left unresolved two related issues. The narrowness of
Gault's holding created some confusion about the applicability of the
Court's ruling to other stages of a delinquency proceeding and to
other types of cases, such as status offenses, in which the child faced a
potential loss of liberty.' 50 The Court's opinion also failed to clarify
the role of counsel for the child and left open the question whether
the lawyer's obligations to the child client differed in any way from
those owed to the adult client.' 51
Several commentators have subsequently interpreted Gault to require zealous advocacy from the child's attorney in delinquency proceedings. Noting the Gault Court's recognition of the similarities
between delinquency and criminal cases,'52 the legal system's commitment to adversarial proceedings, 53 and doubts about the lawyer's
ability to make therapeutic judgments in the child's best interests, 54
these scholars have suggested that the lawyer has an ethical obligation
the child's
to assume a more traditional role in juvenile court. Thus, 55
who has
lawyer is a partisan advocate at all stages of the proceeding
a duty to present the best possible case for her client.' 5 6 The lawyer
should treat all communications with the child as confidential and
should vigorously protect the child's privilege against self-incrimination.' 57 Furthermore, the lawyer should not hesitate to put the state
58
to its burden of proof, even if that may mean the client's release.'
148. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
149. Id. at 41.
150. Id. at 13. The Court announced:
We do not... consider the impact of constitutional provisions upon the
totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state. We do not even
consider the entire process relating to juvenile "delinquents." For example
we are not here concerned with the procedures or constitutional rights applicable to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor do we direct our
attention to the post-adjudicative or dispositional process.
Id.
151. Norman Lefstein, In re Gault, Juvenile Courts and Lawyers, 53 A.B.A. J. 811,
812 (1967); see Monrad G. Paulsen, The ConstitutionalDomestication of the Juvenile
Court, 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 233, 261-62.
152. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 24, 27.
153. Paulsen, supra note 151, at 264.
154. Id. at 262.
155. See Elizabeth D. Dyson & Richard B. Dyson, Family Courts in the United
States, 9 J. Far. L. 1, 58 (1969).
156. See Paulsen, supra noti 151, at 261-62.
157. See Theodore McMillian & Dorothy L. McMurtry, The Role of the Defense
Lawyer in the Juvenile Court-Advocate or Social Worker?, 14 St. Louis U. L.J. 561,
598 (1970); Paulsen, supra note 151, at 262-63.
158. McMillian & McMurtry, supra note 157, at 598.
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This vision of the child's lawyer as zealous advocate is consistent
with the client autonomy paradigm of lawyering. The parallels between delinquency and criminal proceedings suggest that the justification for adversariness is equally applicable to all cases in which the
state seeks to limit the freedom of the individual.' 5 9 Because freedom

is a central value, the erroneous deprivation of individual liberty is
intolerable even when the person whose freedom is constrained is a
child. 1 60 Thus, the lawyer as loyal partisan facilitates the accuracy of
factual and legal determinations in the juvenile court by challenging
and presenting evidence.' 6 ' The attorney's role as zealous advocate
and ardent defender of the child, therefore, is entirely appropriate
within a legal system that values individual freedom. 162
Furthermore, this approach to lawyering accords the child client
considerable autonomy. Some commentators have indicated that the
lawyer is obligated to seek those results desired by the child client and
to represent the child's expressed preferences. 63 Such an approach
comports with traditional ethical rules governing the attorney's behavior' 64 while promoting certain goals of the legal system.' 65 The lawyer's failure to act upon the client's objectives, however, would
prevent the child from presenting certain legal claims to the court for
consideration and adjudication. 66 The adversarial approach is also
likely to encourage respect for the courts if the child, as a participant,
believes she has had a full and fair opportunity to present her case
through loyal counsel' 67
159. Id.at 598.
160. Paulsen, supra note 151, at 237; see Antieau, supra note 134, at 387-88;
Thomas A. Welch, Delinquency Proceedings-FundamentalFairnessfor the Accused
in a Quasi-CriminalForum, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 653, 662-64 (1966).
161. Paulsen, supra note 151, at 261-62; Welch, supra note 160, at 673.
162. Antieau, supra note 134, at 405-06; Paulsen, supra note 151, at 261; Welch,
supra note 160, at 695.
163. Institute of Judicial Administration, American Bar Association Standards Relating to Counsel for Private Parties, Part 3.1(b)(ii)[a], at 17 (1979) [hereinafter IJAABA Standards]; 1 Randy Hertz et al., Trial Manual for Defense Attorneys in Juvenile Court 13 (1991); Samuel M. Davis, The Role of the Attorney in Child Advocacy,
32 J. Fain. L. 817, 830 (1994); Elyce Z. Ferster et al., The Juvenile Justice System: In
Search of the Role of Counsel, 39 Fordham L. Rev. 375, 387 (1971); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76, 87 (1984); Daniel L. Skoler, The Right to
Counsel and the Role of Counsel in Juvenile Court Proceedings,43 Ind. L.J. 558, 580
(1968); George L. Lyon Jr., Comment, Ethical Obligationsof Defense Counsel in the
Juvenile Court, 3 J. Juv. L. 135, 147 (1979).
164. Davis, supra note 163, at 829-30; Ferster et al., supra note 163, at 387; Lyon,
supra note 163, at 144-45. But see Guggenheim, supranote 163, at 96-99 (arguing that
ethical rules do not provide the lawyer representing a client under seven years of age
with sufficient guidance as to her role).
165. Lyon, supra note 163, at 145-46.
166. Id. at 146-47.
167. Monrad G. Paulsen, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts, and the Poor Man, 54 Cal.
L. Rev. 694, 705 (1966); H. Bruce Hamilton, Comment, In re Gault and the Persisting
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The client autonomy model, however, does assume a competent client. Therefore, several proponents of the adversarial approach to
lawyering for the child have suggested that, in most instances, the
child client is capable of making decisions about her case. 168 They
argue that the assumption of incompetency often is based on a definition of capacity that few adult clients could meet: to require more 1of
69
the child client merely because of her age would be illegitimate.
Furthermore, the child's prosecution for a delinquent act reflects a
legislative determination that the child is of sufficient maturity to be
held accountable for her actions if she is adjudicated. 7 ° Thus, fairness
mandates that any individual held morally responsible for her actions
71
should be given the autonomy to seek the outcome she desires.'
Although proponents of the client autonomy model note that the
child often is competent to instruct the attorney, they also concede
that the young child may be incompetent to make certain decisions. 172
Consequently, the lawyer must make an initial assessment of the minor's decision-making capacity. 173 Under certain circumstances, if the
attorney determines that the child is incapable of making reasoned
choices, the attorney may make decisions on behalf of her client. 7 4

Such decisions should be made only after the lawyer has conducted a
thorough investigation and considered the child's wishes and interests. 175 The lawyer, too, should argue for the least intrusive disposition that may be justified under the circumstances. 76
Assessments of client competence, however, provide significant opportunities for unwarranted infringements upon client autonomy. The
lawyer's belief in the foolishness of the choice may convince the lawyer that the child is not capable of considered judgment. 77 Furthermore, even within the client autonomy paradigm, there continues to
Questions of ProceduralDue Process and Legal Ethics in Juvenile Courts, 47 Neb. L.
Rev. 558, 590 (1968).
168. See, e.g.,*UA-ABA Standards, supra note 163, at 8 (stating that most adolescents meet the standard of understanding the "nature and purposes of the proceedings and [their] general consequences").
169. Id.
170. Guggenheim, supra note 163, at 87 (argiung that the decision to prosecute7
children seven years of age and older for delinquent acts reflects legislative judgment
that such children are mature enough to be held accountable for their actions).
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., I.A-ABA Standards, supra note 163, Part 3.1(b)(ii)[c][3].
173. Lyon, supra note 163, at 148. It is unclear exactly how the lawyer is to make an
initial assessment of the child's capacity. The HIA-ABA Standards suggest that a child
is competent if she understands the nature and purposes of the proceedings and its
general consequences, and is able to formulate her desires as to those proceedings.
HIA-ABA Standards, supra note 163, at 8.
174. HIA-ABA Standards, supra note 163, Part 3.1(b)(ii)(c); Lyon, supra note 163,
at 148.
175. HA-ABA Standards, supra note 163, Part 3.1(b) cmt. at 82.
176. Id. Part 3.1(b)(ii)[c][3].
177. Id. cmt. at 81-82.
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be some recognition of the need to preserve the client's future autonomy. Thus, the minor's attorney may have a special role in juvenile
court given the needs and possibilities of the child. 1 78 The lawyer may
counsel the juvenile about the importance of accepting responsibility
for her wrongful acts' 7 9 and explain the limits of her advocacy.'8
In the absence of a clear articulation that the child has a right to
counsel, pervasive beliefs about the incompetency of children structure the attorney's role in juvenile court. Because the Gault Court did
not indicate the extent to which its holding might be applicable to
other stages of a delinquency proceeding, some commentators have
argued that counsel for the child is not bound by her traditional professional obligations in nonadjudicatory hearings.' 81 For example,
during the dispositional phase, the lawyer has an obligation to consider the welfare of her client even though she may have acted as an
ardent defender of the child's rights during the adjudicative stage of
the proceedings as A nonadversarial approach to the representation
of the child is a practical necessity because the child lacks the capacity
to instruct her attorney. 183 Furthermore, this approach would pro:
mote the child's welfare by insuring a more thorough and nonpunitive
disposition and, ultimately, would preserve the minor's right to receive rehabilitative treatment.'84
For critics of an adversarial role, systemic concerns for the minor's
welfare and rehabilitation appropriately limit the adversarial behavior
of lawyers.' 8 5 During the dispositional phase of a delinquency proceeding, a systemic concern for the child's well-being suggests that the
judge should consider a range of dispositional alternatives. 8 6 But adversariness would impede the court's search for an appropriate dispoto the child's disadvantage if the judge were to
sition,
imposeredounding
a more restrictive disposition out of ignorance of the available
alternatives.1s7 According to these critics, the child's attorney, should
adopt a nonadversarial posture to insure that the court consider a
178. Spencer Coxe, Lawyers in Juvenile Court, 13 Crime & Delinq., 488, 490 (1967);
Paulsen; supra note 151, at 261-62 (noting, nevertheless, that there is a limit to the
special stance a lawyer may take in the juvenile court).
179. Skoler, supra note 163, at 580.
180. Gregory L. Curtis, In Defense of a Youth, 36 Mont. L. Rev. 225,225-26 (1975);
Hamilton, supra note 167, at 591; Charles L. Merz, Comment, Representing the Juve-

nile Defendant in Waiver Proceedings, 12 St. Louis U. LJ. 424, 451 (1968).
181. Richard Kay & Daniel Segal, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court Pro-

ceedings: A Non-PolarApproach, 61 Geo. L.J. 1401, 1407-08 (1973).

182. Julian Greenspun, Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court, 18 Clev. St. L. Rev.

599, 602 (1969); Robert W. Lockwood, The Role of the Attorney in the Treatment
Phase of the Juvenile Court Process, 12 St. Louis U. L.J. 659, 661 (1968).
183. See Kay & Segal, supra note 181, at 1415.
184. Id. at 1419.

185. For a discussion of systemic limitations upon a lawyer's zealous advocacy, see
supra note 60 and accompanying text.
186. Kay & Segal, supra note 181, at 1416-17.
187. Id. at 1417.
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broader range of alternative proposals for disposition.'18 The result
may be a more positive disposition that proves less restrictive for the
child. 189

These critics also argue that the attorney's nonadversarial role at
disposition serves an additional systemic interest in uncovering the
truth.190 Certainly, assisting the court in searching for the truth does

sacrifice some of the client's rights; the child, however, may be advantaged by her lawyer's nonadversarial approach. 19 ' By presenting
the court with information about the child, rather than simply the of92
fense, the attorney may help structure a less punitive disposition.
Furthermore, in light of the additional information presented, the
judge may be reluctant to impose a disposition that is punitive and
restrictive. 193 This approach may actually advance the child's right to
rehabilitative treatment because the court may be forced to consider
the child's needs. 194
From this perspective, the justification for adversarial behavior has
little persuasive moral force. It is the lawyer's nonadversarialbehavi6r that promotes the child's rehabilitation during the dispositional
phase of a delinquency proceeding. In this sense, it can be said that
the lawyer engages in a positive moral act that benefits the child by
espousing the child's right to rehabilitation and treatment. 195 Similarly, the lawyer's duty to convince the minor that the court's disposition is fair is morally obligatory because by securing the child's
compliance with the court's orders, the lawyer facilitates the child's
rehabilitation. 196 By counseling the client to accept tesponsibility for
her actions,'197 the lawyer also promotes the client's goodness.
In practice, many attorneys seem to favor a*lawyering paradigm that
accords them considerable autonomy and independence from their
child clients. Studies conducted after the Gault decision have found
that strong systemic pressures discourage adversarial behavior during
all stages of a delinquency case. 198 Juvenile court judges have resisted
188. Id. at 1417-18.
189. Id.

190. Id at 1418.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1419.
193. Id. at 1418.
194. Id. at 1419-20.

195. See id.
196. Joseph T. Walsh, Comment, The Attorney and the DispositionalProcess, 12 St.
Louis U. L.J. 644, 654-55 (1968).
197. Coxe, supra note 178, at 490 (stating that a sensitive lawyer knows when confession is good for the client's soul); Curtis, supra note 180, at 249 (stating that when
the state acts as parens patriae, a lawyer should subrogate his role as advocate, but
remain a fierce adversary when the state acts to imperil the child's interests); Walsh,
supra note 195, at 654.
198. David Duffee & Larry Siegel, The OrganizationMan: Legal Counsel in the
Juvenile Court, 7. Crim. L. Bull. 544, 552-53 (1971); Monrad G. Paulsen, Juvenile
Courts and the Legacy of '67, 43 Ind. L.. 527, 536-37 (1968) (reciting complaints of
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Gault's implementation by providing children with prejudicial advice
about the right to counsel and waiver, 199 imposing more severe sanctions upon those who appeared with counsel at disposition,"' and

failing to assiduously apply the burden of proof.20 ' Attorneys have

continued to identify with a nonadversarial role because of hostility
from juvenile court judges and a general belief in the appropriateness
of serving the child's best interests.2 02 The relationship between attorney and child client is, consequently, paternalistic because of the lawyer's perceptions about the child's dependent status and
immaturity.2 0
The Child's Counsel in Abuse and Neglect Proceedings
The right to and role of counsel in abuse and neglect proceedings is
even less clear. The United States Supreme Court has never held that
the child in an abuse or neglect proceeding has a constitutional right
to counsel, although most jurisdictions require independent representation for the child.2 0 4 Federal law does mandate the appointment of
a guardian ad litem for the minor,20 5 but does not indicate whether the
20 6
guardian should also be a lawyer nor what her duties should be.
State laws also fail to clarify the identity and responsibilities of the
child's representative. 20 7 Nevertheless, some commentators have arB.

juvenile court judges that lawyers are too adversarial in juvenile court); Anthony Platt
et al., In Defense of Youth: A Case of the Public Defender in Juvenile Court, 43 Ind.
LJ. 619, 621 (1968); Platt & Friedman, supra note 127, at 1176 ("There is strong pressure from legislatures, judges and legal commentators to repress adversary tactics in
juvenile court") Id.
199. Norman Lefstein et al., In Search of Juvenile Justice: Gault and Its Implementation, 3 Law & Soc'y Rev. 491, 511-16 (1969).
200. Duffee & Siegel, supra note 198, at 550-52; Barry C. Feld, In re Gault Revisited. A Cross-State Comparisonof the Right to Counselin Juvenile Court,34 Crime &
Delinq. 393, 403-05, 409-16 (1988). But see Ferster, supra note 163, at 402 (stating
that more judicial findings of "not involved" and fewer commitments when children
represented by counsel).
201. Martin Guggenheim, Conducting a Bench Trial, Crim. Just., Summer 1986, at
20, 20-21 (noting that judges seldom apply the burden of proof, preferring to keep
children in the system).
202. Ferster, supra note 163, at 406 n.167; John H. Laub & Bruce K. MacMurray,
Increasingthe Prosecutor'sRole in Juvenile Court: Expectations and Realities, 12 Just.
Sys. J. 196, 203-04 (1987); Debra C. Moss, In re Gault Now 20, But..., 73 A.B.A.J.,
June 1, 1987, at 29,29; Platt & Friedman, supra note 127, at 1183-84; Platt et al., supra
note 198, at 624-28; Stephen G. Walker, The Lawyer-Child Relationship: A Statistical
Analysis, 9 Duq. L. Rev. 627, 644-45 (1971).
203. See Platt et al., supra note 198, at 625, 633; Platt & Friedman, supra note 127,
at 1179-80, 1184; Walker, supra note 202, at 627.
204. Donald Duquette & Sarah Ramsey, Representationof Children in Child Abuse
and Neglect Cases: An Emprical Look at What Constitutes Effective Representation,
20 J.L. Reform 341, 346 (1987).
205. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(G) (1974).
206. Sarah H. Ramsey, Representation of the Child in ProtectionProceedings: The
Determination of Decision-Making Capacity, 17 Faro. L.Q. 287, 289 (1983).
207. Id. at 289-90.
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gued that the child does not need independent representation because
her interests will be adequately protected either by the attorneys for
the parents or by the state.20 Others, however, have acknowledged
that the child should have independent representation, although there
is significant disagreement about whether the child's representative
should be a lawyer or a guardian ad litem and the appropriate role for
that representative.20 9
Those who do see a role for an attorney in abuse and neglect proceedings differ as to the nature of that role. Some have argued that
the attorney has a duty to zealously advocate the child's expressed
preferences, even when the attorney disagrees with the client's objectives.210 Such representation rejects unwarranted paternalistic prac21
tices and is consistent with a deep respect for individual autonomy. '
From this perspective, the child has a right to have her views expressed to the court and the attorney should not substitute her judgment for that of the child.212 Under certain circumstances, the ethical
obligations of the profession may even require the lawyer to advocate
for a position that would prove-harmful to the child.

3

This vision of lawyering promotes the child client's autonomy. By
defining the attorney's role to mandate zealous representation of the
child's expressed wishes, this lawyering model recognizes the value of
the child's preferences and permits her participation in the proceedings. Representation of the child's desires also may focus the court on
the child and her needs rather than on her parents' behavior.2 1 4 Additionally, the promotion of the child's autonomy may have a positive
effect on the ultimate disposition of the client's case. The complexity
and uncertainty inherent in these cases suggest that the child's wishes
are just as likely to be right as those made on her behalf; consequently, representing the child's preferences may result in better and
more accurate decisions.2 5
208. Duquette & Ramsey, supra note 204, at 347.
209. Ramsey, supra note 206, at 288-91.
210. Douglas I. Besharov, Representing Abused and Neglected Children: When
Protecting Children Means Seeking the Dismissal of Court Proceedings, 20 J. Far. L.
217, 234-35 (1981-82); Duquette & Ramsey, supra note 204, at 352; Leonard P. Edwards & Inger J. Sagatun, Domestic Violence, Child Abuse, and the Law: Who Speaks

for the Child?, 2 U. Chi. Roundtable 67, 70 n.16 (1995); Massachusetts Bar Ass'n,
Opinions of the Comm. on Professional Ethics: Op. No. 93-6, 78 Mass. L. Rev. 153,

154 (1993); Ramsey, supra note 206, at 320; Ventrell, supra note 5, at 79-80; Jennifer
Bellah, Comment, Appointing Counselfor the Child in Actions to Terminate Parental
Rights, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 481, 510-11 (1982).

211. Ramsey, supra note 206, at 320.
212. Besharov, supra note 210, at 235-36; Edwards & Sagatun, supra note 210, at 70
n.16; Ventrell, supra note 5, at 281-82.
213. Ventrell, supra note 5, at 280-82.
214. Ramsey, supra note 206, at 295.
215. Besharov, supra note 210, at 235-36.

1996]

ETHICS OF EMPOWERMENT

1681

Client autonomy does presuppose a client capable of autonomous
action. Proponents of a zealous advocate for the child in abuse and
neglect proceedings thus argue that most children are capable of considered judgment and are mature enough to understand crucial aspects of the proceedings in which they are involved. 6 They note that
if the child client is capable of expressing a mature judgment, then the
attorney has an obligation to espouse the client's preferences.217 The
mere ability to express a preference, however, is not an adequate test
of capacity. 218 Rather, the child must have the intellectual and emo219
tional capability of making a decision that is reasonably accurate.
Proponents of this view note that the lawyer must make an initial
determination about the child's capacity to make a reasoned decision.2 0 The evaluation of the child's competence, however, may create occasions for needless paternalism. 221 The assessment of capacity
is highly subjective. m2 In difficult cases, the lawyer may be tempted to
evaluate the child's capacity based on the "rightness" of her decision,
if only because the lawyer may find it easier to advocate for a position
with which she is in agreement. 2m The lawyer's uncertainty about her
client's capabilities also may engender an ambivalence in the lawyer's
representation of the child that leaves neither lawyer nor client
satisfied. 24
To avoid unnecessary infringements upon the child's autonomy,
proponents of client autonomy contend that the attorney should not
assume that her client is incompetent merely because she is a child.t2
Furthermore, the attorney should be careful to distinguish the decision-making process from the actual decision made by the child to
assure that the minor's autonomy is not needlessly overridden simply
because the attorney disagrees with the choices made by the child. 6
Even when the attorney has determined that her client is incompetent,
she nevertheless has an obligation to express the child's views to the
court out of a respect for the child's feelings. 227 But under this view,
the lawyer is still free to advance what she believes to be in her client's
216. See, e.g., IJA-ABA Standards, supra note 163, Part 3.1(b)(ii)(b) & cmt. at 81.
217. Id.; Besharov, supra note 210, at 234; Edwards & Sagatun, supra note 210, at
70 n.16; Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, supra note 210, at 154; Ramsey, supra note 206, at
320; Bellah, supra note 210, at 510.
218. Ramsey, supra note 206, at 306.
219. dL at 307.
220. 1& at 305-07; see also Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, supra note 210, at 154.
221. Ramsey, supra note 206, at 308-09.
222. IL at 310; Besharov, supra note 210, at 236.
223. Ramsey, supra note 206, at 307.
224. Besharov, supra note 210, at 236.
225. Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, supra note 210, at 154.
226. Ramsey, supra note 206, at 307-09.
227. Besharov, supra note 210, at 235-36; Edwards & Sagatun, supra note 210, at 70
n.16.
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interests once she determines that the minor is incompetent. 2z According to its proponents, such advocacy, although contrary to the
child's present wishes, may actually foster greater client autonomy by
preserving the child's opportunities for future decision making.229
By focussing on the nature of the child's interests in abuse and neglect proceedings, other critics have concluded that advocating the
child's expressed preferences is not central to the role of counsel for
the child. These writers note that the purpose of an abuse dr neglect
proceeding is the protection of the child from abusive or neglectful
parenting. 3 Nevertheless, in the absence of an adjudication, there is
no reason to presume that the interests of parents and their children
diverge.231 From this perspective, independent representation for the
minor may be unnecessary because the parties to the proceeding-the
child's parents and the state-could be expected to vigorously litigate
issues pertaining to the child's welfare.3 2 Moreover, the child's own
preferences are irrelevant to the initial determination that the child is,
in fact, abused or neglected.233
If, however, separate counsel is appointed to represent the minor,
she may assume one of several roles, all of which accord the lawyer
significant autonomy. First, the lawyer may ascertain what she believes to be in the child's best interests and then zealously advocate
for a disposition consistent with her views. 2 4 Moreover, the attorney
may seek an appointment as the child's guardian ad litem; because of
her adversarial skills and familiarity with courtroom procedures, the
attorney may be in the best position to fulfill the obligations of that
role. 235 Alternatively, the lawyer may assume a nonadversarial role
and act as an independent investigator whose job is to provide the
court with all information relevant to the child's interests. 236 Finally,
228. Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, supra note 210, at 154.
229. See Ramsey, supra note 206, at 306.
230. Id. at 291.
231. Guggenheim, supra note 163, at 119. Guggenheim argues that the appointment of separate counsel for children before abuse or neglect charges have been
proven may violate the parents' constitutional rights to make decisions about their
children.
232. See Guggenheim, supra note 163, at 131.
233. Id.

234. See Brian G. Fraser, IndependentRepresentationfor the Abused and Neglected
Child: The Guardian Ad Litem, 13 Cal. W. L. Rev. 16, 33-34 (1976); Guggenheim,

supra note 163, at 100; David 0. Bell et al., Comment, A Recommendation for CourtAppointed Counsel in Child-Abuse Proceedings,46 Miss. L.J. 1072, 1092-93 (1975).
235. Fraser, supra note 234, at 30; Robert Kelly & Sarah Ramsey, Do Attorneys for
Children in Protection Proceedings Make a Difference?-A Study of the Impact of
Representation Under Conditions of High JudicialIntervention, 21 J. Fano. Law 405,

411 (1982-83). But see Rebecca H. Heartz, Guardians Ad Litem in Child Abuse and
Neglect Proceedings: Clarifyingthe Roles to Improve Effectiveness, 27 Fam. L.Q. 327,
338-41 (1993) (arguing that lay volunteers are effective advocates for children).
236. Fraser, supra note 234, at 34 (noting that the lawyer also has a role as an advocate); Guggenheim, supra note 163, at 107-08.
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the lawyer may define her role in a dependency proceeding more narrowly prior to an adjudication and oppose the state's attempts to establish parental unfitness.2 37 This comports with the legal
presumption that it is in the child's best interests to be reared by her
natural parents.23s
From this perspective, the child's preferences are secondary to the
child's interests as defined by some other, capable adult. Thus, the
minor's wishes and desires may be construed as irrelevant to a determination of what is best for the child.2 39 The attorney, therefore, need
not represent the child's views if they conflict with the child's interests, although the lawyer may have some obligation to communicate
the minor's preferences to the court.240 Moreover, relating the child's
wishes to the court enhances the judge's ability to make a reasoned
decision about the child based on all available information.241 The
attorney's role as spokesperson for the minor, however, must be balanced against her role as advocate for the child's best interests. 24 2
Furthermore, the child client's inability to instruct counsel mandates a lawyering paradigm that does not center on client autonomy.
Under this view, young children lack the capacity to make reasoned
choices and may be incapable of articulating a preference to counsel.24 3 Consequently, the lawyer may be unable to advocate for her
client's expressed wishes and may find herself taking a position that
accords with her own views of the child's interests.2 ' Because of her
incompetency, the minor's present wishes may endanger her future
well-being and the attorney may justifiably act to protect the child
from her present desires. 245 The attorney, therefore, may be unable to
rely on her client's expressed wishes and may have
a duty to notify the
246
court about the extent of the child's incapacity.
The lawyer's role thus envisioned affords the attorney considerable
autonomy. The determination of the client's interests is left to the
child's lawyer, although she may consider the views of experts as well
as of the child herself.2 47 Moreover, the lawyer has an obligation to
protect the minor and may override her client's wishes in order to
237. Guggenheim, supra note 163, at 138-39.

238. Id.
239. Id. at 131.
240. Edwards & Sagatun, supra note 210, at 74; James R. Redeker, The Right of an
Abused Child to Independent Counsel and the Role of the Child Advocate in Child
Abuse Cases, 23 Vill. L. Rev. 521, 545 (1977-78).
241. Edwards & Sagatun, supra note 210, at 74.
242. Redeker, supra note 240, at 545.
243. Edwards & Sagatun, supra note 210, at 75; Guggenheim, supranote 163, at 9394.
244. Guggenheim, supra note 163, at 94.
245. Redeker, supra note 240, at 545.
246. Id.
247. 1&
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preserve the child's future options.' The lawyer's decision to disregard the child's preferences nevertheless is morally justifiable, even
though the child's autonomy is infringed, because the lawyer's actions
are necessary to preserve the client's future ability to make responsible choices. In this sense, the lawyer acts morally when she acts
paternalistically.
In practice, there is still considerable confusion about the proper
role for child's counsel in an abuse or neglect case. State statutes and
court rulings do not clarify the role of counsel in abuse and neglect
proceedings and trial judges may obscure the lawyer's role by directing counsel to assume contradictory obligations. 249 The lawyer
may be uncertain about whether she should remain neutral, act as an
investigator, or provide the court with her own assessment of the
child's best interests. 250 Furthermore, the lawyer may receive little
guidance from the court as to her obligation to represent the child's
expressed preferences as opposed to the child's interestsl 1 Serious
questions also have been raised about the dedication and effectiveness
25 2
of counsel for the child in abuse and neglect proceedings.
C. The Lawyer for the Child in Custody Disputes
As in abuse and neglect proceedings, the child has no definitive
right to counsel in a disputed custody matter ancillary to a divorce
proceeding. 5 3 Some writers contend that the child does not need independent representation because the child's interests are adequately
protected by one or both of the parents' attorneys154 From this perspective, a custody dispute is an essentially private matter between
two individuals and appointing an independent representative for the
child would be unduly intrusive.1-5 Furthermore, the appointment of
248. Id.
249. Ann M. Haralambie, The Child's Attorney: A Guide to Representing Children in Custody, Adoption, and Protection Cases 3 (1993).
250. Kelley & Ramsey, supra note 235, at 412.
251. Id. at 413.
252. Duquette & Ramsey, supra note 204, at 385-91; Kelley & Ramsey, supra note
235, at 451-54; Ramsey, supra note 206, at 302.
253. Compare Monroe L. Inker & Charlotte Anne Perretta, A Child's Right to
Counsel in Custody Cases, 55 Mass. L.Q. 229,235 (1970) (purpose of custody hearing
so similar to that of juvenile hearing that procedures required by Gault have some
application to custody hearings) with Guggenheim, supra note 163, at 119 (asserting
that Gault is not a precedent for right to counsel for young children in custody cases).
254. Representing Children: Standards for Attorneys and Guardians ad Litem in
Custody or Visitation Proceedings § 1.1 cmt. at 3-4 (Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law.
1994) [hereinafter Representing Children]; Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Paul C. Vitz,
Child Protective Divorce Laws: A Response to the Effects of ParentalSeparation on
Children, 17 Faro. L.Q. 327, 350 (1983); see Nanette Dembitz, Beyond Any Discipline's Competence, 83 Yale LJ.1304, 1312 (1974) (reviewing Joseph Goldstein et al.,
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973)).
255. Representing Children, supra note 254, § 1.1 cmnt. at 4-5 (stating that custody
proceedings are "private disputes," and the "fact that parents have decided to resolve
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a child's representative would generate unnecessary delay, increase
fees, and impose additional financial and psychological costs.- 56 There
is also a possibility that the representative's assessment of the child's
interests will receive undue weight, particularly when the representative agrees with an expert witness." 7 If the attorney does receive an
appointment to represent the child in a disputed custody case, the lawyer should offer no active assistance at trial. 58
Nevertheless, most states permit the discretionary appointment of a
representative for the child, although that representative may not be
an attorney. 25 9 Eight states mandate the appointment of a representative, but that appointment is contingent upon the existence of certain
conditions, such as an allegation of abuse or neglect.2 60 Only one state
mandates the appointment of a representative when custody is contested.26 ' Some state statutes permit the court to appoint an attorney,262 an attorney or a guardian ad litem, 263 or an attorney as the
guardian ad litem to represent the child. 264 While most of these statutes require the representation of the child's interests, it is unclear
whether the child's preferences should be advocated in addition to or
in lieu of the minor's best interests.265
Among those who do see a role for an attorney in a custody proceeding, there are two views as to the nature of that role and the obligations of the lawyer to her child client. Some commentators evoke
the lawyer autonomy paradigm and argue that the attorney's role is to
ensure the protection of the child's best interests by advancing her
view of-what she believes will best serve the child.2 66 The attorney
should zealously represent the minor's interests and present all reletheir dispute in a contested manner is insufficient reason to require a separate legal
representative for children in most cases"); Guggenheim, supra note 163, at 121-22.
256. Representing Children, supra note 254, § 1.1 cmt. at 3-4.
257. Martha Albertson Fmeman, The Illusion of Equality: The Rhetoric and Reality of Divorce Reform 106-07 (1991).

258. Guggenheim, supra note 163, at 125 (discussing the proper role of the attorney
when the child-client is without a preference or is too young to express one).
259. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places,supra note 10, at 1551-52

& nn.170-74. Texas subsequently recodified its statute. See Tex. Fain. Code Ann.
§ 107.001 (West 1995).

260. Id.at 1552 & nn.171-74.
261. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.045(1)(a)(2) (West 1993).
262. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places, supra note 10, at 1553
&n.177.
263. Id.at 1554.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1554-55.
266. Cochran & Vitz, supra note 254, at 351; Tarn Eitzen, A Child's Right to Independent Legal Representation in a Custody Dispute, 19 Farn. L. Q. 53, 68 (1985);
Robert E. Sheperd, Jr., Solomon's Sword. Adjudication of Child Custody Questions, 8
U. Rich. L. Rev. 156, 169-70 (1974); Brenda Magaziner Flock, Comment, Custody
Disputes Arising From Divorce: The Child's Need for Counsel in Pennsylvania, 87
Dick. L. Rev. 351, 362 (1982); Ron Hewitt, Comment, McKercher v. McKercher, Independent Counsel for Children in Custody Disputes, 42 Sask. L. Rev. 295, 302-03
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vant evidence as to the child in court.267 If there is a conflict between
what the child wants and what the attorney thinks the child should
have, the attorney need not be bound by the client's expressed preferences.2 68 Under these circumstances, the lawyer may argue her own
opinion as to the child's best interests and specifically urge the court
to discount the child's views.2 69
Other writers, however, argue that the child's attorney should respect and promote her client's autonomy. Under this view, the attorney is a zealous advocate who should represent the child's expressed
preferences rather than the attorney's own opinion of what is in the
child's best interests.270 The lawyer is a representative of the child
alone and should not advocate the competing claims of the child's parents.271 Moreover, the attorney should treat her child client much as
she would any adult client and capably defend the child's views in the
courtroom.2 7 2 If the lawyer disagrees with the child's stated prefer(1977-78); Sibylle Kobienia, Comment, Separate Representation in Custody Cases, 6
Adel. L. Rev. 466, 474 (1978).
267. Linda D. Elrod, Counselfor the Child in Custody Disputes: The Time is Now,
26 Faro. L.Q. 53, 63 (1992); Marvin C. Holz, The Child Advocate in Private Custody
Disputes: The Wisconsin Experience, 16 J. Fain. L. 739, 741-42 (1977-78); Inker &
Perretta, supra note 253, at 239-40; Carl E. K. Johnson, The Role of the Guardianad
Litem in Custody and Visitation Disputes, 17 Colo. Law. 1301, 1303 (1988).
268. Jeff Atkinson, Modem Child Custody Practice 712 (1986); Robert I. Berdon,
A Child's Right to Counsel in a Contested Custody Proceeding Resulting From a Termination of the Marriage,50 Conn. Bar J. 150, 165 (1976); Debra L. Norberg, Comment, "Mom, Dad, I Want to Introduce My Lawyer": The Development of Child
Advocacy in Family Law, 29 S.D. L. Rev. 98, 109 (1983); see Eitzen, supranote 266, at
68-69; Flock, supra note 266, at 362; Kobienia, supra note 266, at 474.
269. Atkinson, supra note 268, at 712.
270. Haralambie, supra note 249, at 31; Berdon, supra note 268, at 165; Donald N.
Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions: All That Glitters is Not
Gault, 15 J. Faro. L. 27, 34 (1976-77); Elrod, supra note 267, at 68-69; James K.
Genden, Separate Legal Representationfor Children: Protectingthe Rights and Interests of Minors in JudicialProceedings, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 565, 588-89 (1976);
Jonathan 0. Hafen, Children'sRights and Legal Representation- The ProperRoles of
Children, Parents, and Attorneys, 7 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 423, 448
(1993); Linda L. Long, When the Client is a Child: Dilemmas in the Lawyer's Role, 21
J. Fam. L. 607, 633 (1982-83); Wallace J. Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes:A Role in Search of a Standard, 16 J. Fam. L. 1, 16 (1977-78); Louis I.
Parley, Representing Children in Custody Litigation, 11 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law.
45, 56 (1993); Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative
Custody After Divorce, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 687, 749 (1985); Kerin S. Bischoff, Comment,
The Voice of a Child: IndependentLegal Representationof Children in Private Custody
Disputes When Sexual Abuse is Alleged, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1383, 1392 (1990); RobynMarie Lyon, Comment, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for
Minors, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 681, 706 (1987); Paul K. Milmed, Note, Due Processfor Children: A Right to Counsel in Custody Proceedings, 4 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change
177, 187-88 (1974); Edward Sokolnicki, Note, The Attorney as Guardianad Litem for
a Child in Connecticut, 5 Conn. Prob. L.J. 237, 254 (1991); Maurice K. C. Wilcox,
Note, A Child's Due Process Right to Counsel in Divorce Custody Proceedings, 27
Hastings L.J. 917, 949 (1976).
271. Bischof supra note 270, at 1393.
272. Haralambie, supra note 249, at 12; Parley, supra note 270, at 57-58.
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ences, the lawyer nevertheless has a duty to present and vindicate
those views in court.2 73
This view of the lawyer as zealous advocate for the child's expressed
wishes acknowledges the child client as a capable and autonomous
being. From this perspective, the opinions of a competent child deserve the same respect as those of an adult. 74 Because the minor
does have the capacity to make a reasoned and intelligent choice, she
should be permitted to present her views to the court through an independent and partisan advocate.2 75 The lawyer thus has an obligation to ensure that the child's voice is heard throughout the course of
the proceedings. 76 Moreover, a child who is a sufficiently mature and
competent individual is capable of instructing her attorney and pro277
viding her lawyer with the necessary guidance as to her objectives.
Furthermore, this approach underscores the institutional commitment to the adversary system. Adversariness has value because it preserves and facilitates client autonomy by giving the child access to law
and legal structures. 278 Some commentators have argued that the
child's right of access may. have constitutional dimensions, for due
process may require the protection of the child's liberty interest in her
placement.2 79 But even in the absence of a constitutional mandate,
separate counsel for the child is needed because the child's best interests are often compromised in the bargaining process.280 Professional
rules of ethics also mandate the lawyer's role as zealous advocate and
the vigorous representation of the child client's views. 28
From the other perspective, however, the lawyer has considerable
autonomy to determine the child's interests. As with the adversarial
paradigm, this approach also acknowledges the child's need for independent representation because parents may be motivated to sacrifice the child's best interests for other concerns. 2s But this view of
273. Haralambie, supra note 249, at 31; Berdon, supra note 268, at 165; Bersoff,
supranote 270, at 34; Elrod, supra note 267, at 64; Genden, supra note 270, at 588-89;
Hafen, supra note 270, at 462; Long, supra note 270, at 633; Mlyniec, supra note 270,
at 16; Parley, supra note 270, at 56; Schepard, supra note 270, at 748-49; Bischoff,
supra note 270, at 268; Lyon, supra note 270, at 706; Milmed, supra note 270, at 18788; Sokolricki, Note, supra note 270, at 254; Wilcox, supra note 270, at 949.
274. Genden, supra note 270, at 589.
275. Berdon, supra note 268, at 164-65.
276. Elrod, supra note 267, at 63.
277. Berdon, supra note 268, at 165; Genden, supra note 270, at 589.
278. Berdon, supranote 268, at 165 (citing Henry H. Foster, Jr. & Doris J. Freed, A
Bill of Rights for Children, 6 Fain. L.Q. 343, 356 (1972)).
279. Berdon, supranote 268, at 160-61; Genden, supra note 270, at 582-83; Inker &
Perretta, supra note 253, at 234; Long, supra note 270, at 627-30; Milmed, supra note
270, at 179-80.
280. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places, supra note 10, at 1559;
Genden, supra note 270, at 573.
281. Parley, supra note 270, at 54-56.
282. Norberg, supra note 268, at 102-03.
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the lawyer's role values the lawyer's independent judgment.2 8 3 The
child's immaturity and inability to make a reasoned choice require the
child's lawyer to make an independent assessment of the child's best
interests and to advocate her position as to those interests in court.' s
Moreover, this approach recognizes the systemic importance of promoting the minor's welfare 85 by ensuring the presentation of objective evidence as to the child's interests." 6
There is, however, substantial agreement among these commentators as to the attorney's obligations when the child client is incompetent. Those who argue for a more adversarial role for the child's
representative envision a sufficiently mature client who is capable of
reaching a reasoned and intelligent decision.287 If, however, the child
lacks the capacity to articulate a reasonable preference, then the attorney may communicate the child's views to the court while remaining
neutral as to the desirability of the child's proposal.2 8 The lawyer
also may argue for a result contrary to her client's express wishes if, in
her best judgment, the child's stated preference is not a reasonable or
intelligent choice. 9 Whether a particular child has the requisite degree of maturity and capacity to make decisions thus becomes definitive, and the attorney either must make the assessment herself or
request help from the court.2 9°
Both lawyering models, therefore, provide opportunities for paternalistic intervention. From within a lawyer autonomy paradigm, the
necessity for independent moral judgment requires the lawyer to engage the client and shape her objectives. Although this would infringe
upon the client's autonomy, the lawyer is morally justified in refusing
to further those objectives that are irresponsible. But even within the
client autonomy model, the attorney may act paternalistically. From
within this paradigm, a client may be said to be competent only if she
is autonomous; thus, acting on behalf of the incapacitated client does
not infringe upon the client's autonomy.
283. Kim J. Landsman & Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyeringfor the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising From Divorce, 87
Yale L.J. 1126, 1180 (1978).
284. Holz, supra note 267, at 741-43; Hewitt, supra note 266, at 302-03.
285. Kobienia, supra note 266, at 474.
286. Flock; supra note 266, at 362.
287. Haralambie, supra note 249, at 30-31; Berdon, supra note 268, at 165; Eitzen,
supra note 266, at 69; Elrod, supra note 267, at 64; Genden, supra note 270, at 588;
Schepard, supra note 270, at 750; Flock, supra note 266, at 362; Lyon, supra note 270,
at 706; Sokolnicki, supra note 270, at 254.
288. Berdon, supra note 268, at 165.
289. Id. at 165; Flock, supra note 266, at 362; Kobienia, supra note 266, at 474;
Lyon, supra note 270, at 705; Milmed, supra note 270, at 188.
290. See Haralambie, supra note 249, at 32-33; Hafen, supra note 270, at 462; Tara
Lea Muhlhauser, From "Best" to "Better": The Interests of Children and the Role of a
GuardianAd Litem, 66 N. D. L. Rev. 633, 637-38 (1990); Lyon, supra note 270, at 699700.
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Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client

The question of the minor's competence also structures the obligations of the lawyer to communicate with, advise, and counsel the child.
Within the client autonomy paradigm, the attorney should treat the
competent child client much as she would any adult client.2 91 The lawyer should interview the child as soon as possible and as often as is
necessary, as the client is an important source of information about
the case. 2 9 Furthermore, the attorney should encourage a frank and
open discussion and full disclosure of all relevant information so that
she might have a better understanding of the legal matter and more
capably represent the minor.2 93 As with an adult client, the lawyer
implausibility to assess the
should not hesitate to probe for detail and
2 94
client's credibility as a potential witness.
Despite valid reasons for treating child and adult clients similarly,
the capacity, maturity, and intellectual development of the child are
thought to require special communicative and interviewing techniques. 2 95 The minor, for example, is unlikely to have a clear understanding of the legal system and the lawyer's role in that process, and
may be suspicious of the attorney's motivations. 9 6 The child also may
be more passive and suggestible than other clients and may have difficulty recalling events with accuracy 2 97 The minor's degree of language acquisition may further impede successful communication
between lawyer and client because the child simply may not understand the questions asked of her. 9 8 She also may have difficulty expressing herself because of her limited linguistic and cognitive
capabilities. 9 9
From this perspective, the attorney for the child must adapt her interviewing techniques to accommodate the child's special needs. The
lawyer should provide the child with a clear explanation of the attor291. IJA-ABA Standards, supra note 163, Part 4.2(a) cmt. at 99-100; Elrod, supra
note 267, at 63-64; Ventrell, supra note 5, at 274.
292. HIA-ABA Standards, supra note 163, Part 4.2; see Haralambie, supra note 249,
at 66-67.
293. HA-ABA Standards, supra note 163, Part 4.2(b), cmt. at 102.
294. IHA-ABA Standards, supra note 163, Part 4.2(b); see also Perry & Teply, supra
note 5, at 1408 (arguing the need to assess child as witness through'vitally important
pretrial interviews).
295. Atkinson, supra note 268, at 706-10; Haralambie, supra note 249, at 67-69;
Catherine M. Brooks, When a Child Needs a Lawyer, 23 Creighton L. Rev. 757, 75859 (1990); Parley, supra note 270, at 48-49; Perry & Teply, supra note 5, at 1375-76;
Karen J. Saywitz, Bullying Children Won't Work, 10 Far. Advoc., Winter 1988, at 16,
16; Gregory D. Smith, Considerations When Interviewing Children, 12 Children's
Legal Rts. J., Summer 1991, at 2, 3; Ventrell, supra note 5, at 273-74.
296. Perry & Teply, supra note 5, at 1377-78; Saywitz, supra note 295, at 16.
297. Perry & Teply, supra note 5, at 1379, 1387,' 1393; Smith, supra note 295, at 2.
298. Haralambie, supra note 249, at 146-47; Perry & Teply, supra note 5, at 138384; Saywitz, supra note 295, at 18.
299. Haralambie, supra note 249, at 146; Perry & Teply, supra note 5, at 1384;
Saywitz, supra note 295, at 17.
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ney's role and her obligations as zealous advocate and loyal partisan.30 0 The lawyer should also assure the child client that all
communications will be kept confidential and encourage the child to
speak freely and candidly about the case. 301 To ensure the minor's
understanding, the lawyer should ask simple and concrete questions
and avoid legal terminology.302 Additionally, the lawyer should reassure the child and empathize with her feelings in order to facilitate
communication and foster a positive attorney-client relationship. 3
Children, however, are not the only clients who may benefit from
these techniques, which are equally applicable to interviewing situations involving adult clients. Enhancing client communication by using facilitators like empathy and reassurance, avoiding legal
terminology, and improving the client's understanding of the attorney's role are essential to the promotion of client-centered interviewing methodologies." ° Client-centered techniques expressly value
client autonomy because they nurture client control.3 5 By sensitizing
the lawyer to the ways in which she may subordinate her client and
influence client decision making, the lawyer may empower the client
to make decisions about her case in an informed and fully parat
Sc participation
not only improves the attorticipatory manner. 306 Such
ney-client relationship but is likely to enhance client satisfaction with
the outcome of the case. 7
The extent to which the attorney finds interviewing the child client
difficult may actually be a reflection of the attorney's own expectations and assumptions. Class and racial differences between attorney
and client may generate misunderstandings and frustration; consequently, the attorney should be aware that her personal beliefs may
foster unnecessary suspicions about her client.30 8 The attorney, however, could expect these sorts of difficulties even when dealing with an
adult client, but what distinguishes the child client from other kinds of
clients is the attorney's perceptions about the cognitive and emotional
limitations of childhood. The relationship between attorney and client
thus may reflect the lawyer's expectations about the child's capacities
300. Perry & Teply, supra note 5, at 1377-78.
301. Haralambie, supra note 249, at 74; Elrod, supra note 267, at 64; Perry & Teply,
supra note 5, at 1379; Ventrell, supra note 5, at 276.
302. Haralambie, supra note 249, at 75-76; Perry & Teply, supra note 5, at 1383-84.
303. Perry & Teply, supra note 5, at 1381; Saywitz, supra note 295, at 17.
304. See e.g., Binder & Price, supra note 28, at 14-18 (discussing techniques to facilitate full participation by the client).

305. See supra notes 22-29 & accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 27-31 & accompanying text.
307. Binder & Price, supra note 28, at 148; Rosenthal, supra note 29, at 14-15; see
Ellmann, supra note 28, at 720.
308. IJA-ABA Standards, supra note 163, Part 4.2(a), cmt. at 100; H. Freeman & H.
Weihofen, Clinical Law Training 242 (1972).
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that are unrelated to the client's actual abilities.3 °9 This, in turn, may
serve to disempower the minor who will be treated as less competent
to participate in'and make decisions about her case.
Both lawyering paradigms recognize that speaking to the child,
even if she is incompetent, may provide the attorney with new insights
into the case. 310 Nevertheless, the interview's purpose is investigatory
and the lawyer may be more interested in acquiring information than
in developing a rapport with the client. 311 Furthermore, from within
the lawyer autonomy paradigm, ascertaining the client's preferences
may be of secondary importance since the attorney may have the
power to override her client's express wishes.31z Under this view, the
lawyer may not find an interview very constructive, particularly if the
child is very young.31 3 Thus, merely observing the child may satisfy
314
any obligation that the lawyer may have to meet with her client.
Questions about the child's capacity also structure the lawyer's
counseling obligations. When the attorney perceives the client as
competent and she values client autonomy, she should treat the child
client as she would an adult and advise the child fully and candidly
about her case. 31 5 The lawyer should not manipulate or coerce the
child into choosing a particular course of action or usurp the client's
decision-making authority.31 6 This approach also requires the lawyer
to recognize that certain decisions are the client's alone to make,3 17
although the attorney may make some strategic or tactical decisions
on her client's behalf.318 Additionally, the attorney should acknowledge her responsibility to counsel the child about nonlegal matters
make the client aware of other professional treatment
and should
319
services.

From this perspective, there is some recognition of the need to utilize special techniques when counseling the child client. The counseling process should be a collaborative one in which the child is
309. IJA-ABA Standards, supra note 162, Part 402(a), cmt. at 100; Ventrell, supra
note 5, at 273.
310. See e.g., Atkinson, supra note 268, at 706-07; Haralambie, supra note 249, at
66-67; Ventrell, supra note 5, at 275.
311. Brooks, supra note 295, at 764-65; see Sokolnicki, supra note 270, at 245 (recommending ways to fulfill guardian ad litem's function as an investigator); see generally Elrod, supra note 267, at 59 (describing ways in which guardians ad litem conduct
investigations); Inker & Perretta, supra note 253, at 239-240 (discussing ways in
which a child's attorney represents the child).
312. Haralambie, supra note 249, at 6; Elrod, supranote 267, at 60; Ventrell, supra
note 5, at 269.
313. Atkinson, supra note 268, at 706-07.
314. Ventrell, supra note 5, at 275.
315. IJA-ABA Standards, supra note 163, Part 5.1(a) cmt. at 109-10.
316. Id- at 110; Perry & Teply, supra note 5, at 1423.
317. IJA-ABA Standards, supra note 163, Part 5.2(a), cmt. at 111-15; Shannan L.
Wilber, Counselfor Children,27 Fam. L. Q. 349, 353-54 (1993).
318. IJA-ABA Standards, supra note 163, Part 5.2(b), cint. at 115.
319. Id. at Part 5.3 cint. at 116-19.
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encouraged to reach a decision on her own. 32° The attorney should
encourage the child to identify alternatives and to evaluate their legal
and nonlegal consequences.32 ' The lawyer should be careful to avoid
suggesting that one alternative is preferable to another by manipulating the discussion of the various courses of action that may be open to
the client.3 22 Finally, the attorney should help the child reach a final
32
decision and ensure that that choice is truly one made by the cient. 3
These techniques are not only suitable for counseling sessions with
adult clients but also reflect many of the same problems that a clientcentered approach seeks to avoid. Lawyers may manipulate and
deceive all kinds of clients, not just the very young ones. 324 Many
clients, regardless of their age, may feel intimidated by their lawyers
who, consciously or not, may dominate their clients. 25 Participatory
decision making, however, promises to counteract subordination by
empowering the client to make fully informed decisions that will be
respected by her attorney. 26 Furthermore, participatory models promote client autonomy
by giving the client greater control over the out32 7
come of her case.
Because of the connection between client autonomy and capacity,
however, paternalism appears to be warranted when the client is incompetent. Both the client autonomy and the lawyer autonomy paradigms envision a more intrusive approach to counseling the minor if
the lawyer believes the child to be incapacitated. 3 8 At a minimum,
the lawyer should feel free to advise the child about the wisdom of her
position and the likelihood of its success3 2 9 and to counsel the client

about the appropriateness of the case's disposition in order to ensure
the client's acceptance of or compliance with the court's orders.3 3
The attorney may even try to persuade the client to pursue those
objectives that are in her best interests, although the child's expressed
wishes are to the contrary. 33' In some instances, the client's incapacity

may even authorize the attorney to make decisions on behalf of the
child.3 3 2

320. Perry & Teply, supra note 5, at 1425.

321. Id. at 1424.
322. 1& at 1423.
323. Ma at 1425.

324. See supra notes 27-28 & accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 22-23 & accompanying text.
326. Wilber, supra note 317, at 355; Bellah, supra note 209, at 513.
327. Wilber, supra note 317, at 354-55.

328. Elrod, supra note 267, at 65; Ventrell, supra note 5, at 281; Wilber, supra note
317, at 358-59.
329. Wilber, supra note 317, at 354.
330. Walsh, supra note 196, at 654.

331. Ventrell, supra note 5, at 279.
332. Elrod, supranote 267, at 65; Ventrell, supra note 5, at 281; Wilber, supra note
317, at 358-59.
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The issue, then, turns on an assessment of client competency.
Under either paradigm, the lawyer has considerable autonomy to
structure the case when the client is incapacitated. Most commentators do not challenge the centrality of capacity to lawyering models,
although they differ in their assessments of the extent to which incapacity is defined by the boundaries of childhood. Proponents of client
autonomy, therefore, are most likely to be skeptical of claims that
children of a certain age are incompetent and to reject age-based presumptions. 33 Nevertheless, notions about capacity organize the ways
in which lawyers approach their child clients and structure attorneyclient relationships.
III. RtETHNKING LAWYERING
As stated previously, capacity has disadvantaging effects, not the
least of which is an incoherent rights theory that cannot accommodate
notions of children's rights. 3 4 But what if we were able to reconstruct
our rights talk in ways that would acknowledge the status of children
as rights holders? Such a theory would have positive consequences
for children as well as other oppressed and marginalized groups.
Moreover, a coherent account of rights would recognize the value of
rights and rights claims, which have been under critical attack in recent years. 335 A coherent rights theory also may provide a lawyering
paradigm that would account for the powerfulness or powerlessness of
the client and would ultimately offer the lawyer some stronger sense
of what it means to engage in the ethical practice of law.
I think that a coherent account of rights must be premised upon
notions of power. Power structures the interactions between and
among individuals and the state. It is power that permits an individual
to assert a claim against another and power that permits the enforcement of that claim. It is through the exercise of that power that individuals are recognized by others as worthy and their objectives as
having value. Moreover, power creates access by claiming the attention and respect of others.
In its most fundamental sense, a right is power. But note that the
value of rights lies in the redistributive effect they have on power in
any given relationship. Rights have merit because they hold out the
promise of challenging hierarchy and mitigating marginalization. In
this sense, rights do not stem from the power an individual has over
another but from her powerlessness; consequently, rights are a means
of accessing power and of demanding the respect of those with power.
Furthermore, thinking about rights as power enables us to see the dif333. See, e.g., Wilber, supra note 317, at 357.
334. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places, supra note 10, at 1525;
Federle, Rights flow downhill, supra note 10, at 344.
335. See, e.g., Martha Minow, InterpretingRights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96
Yale L.J. 1860, 1860 (1987).
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ferent ways in which we may be marginalized and oppressed by powerful elites who are advantaged by incoherent rights talk.
From a coherent rights perspective, then, having a right does not
depend upon the capacity of the rights holder but upon her powerlessness. Rights prohibit those who have power from exercising it over
those who do not and create zones of respect in which the excluded
may be empowered. Moreover, empowering those who have been
marginalized would reduce their victimization and oppression within
elitist hierarchies because they would no longer be seen as powerless
beings. Grounding rights in notions of power also has the advantage
of allowing us to think about the world as it is, not as it should be.
That, too, is critical because it helps to avoid the pitfalls of rights theories that cannot speak of the realities of the world and thus lack the
force to effectuate real change.
For children, a coherent rights theory permits the child to make
rights claims and to have them heard. The capacity and maturity of
the child is irrelevant within such an account because it is the child's
status as a powerless being that accords her rights. Thinking about
rights in terms of power also allows for challenges to paternalistic
practices that often disguise attempts at control and domination. Recognizing the powerlessness of children enables us to see the relationships they have with others in terms of that powerlessness and to
question claims of acting in the best interests of the child. Furthermore, viewing such claims with skepticism may reveal additional ways
in which children are disempowered by the relationships they have
with others.
Ultimately, our lawyering paradigms are impoverished because they
rest on incoherent accounts of rights. The lawyer has obligations to
the client stemming from the client's legal rights and interests.336
Thus, if the client has no legal right, the lawyer would appear to owe
nothing to the client; moreover, if the client's interests stem from her
incapacities, the lawyer's obligations would center on protecting the
client. Children are disadvantaged by rights talk that is organized
around principles of capacity because they are excluded from the class
of rights holders or have rights that promote their dependencies and
vulnerabilities. This generates considerable confusion about the role
of the lawyer for the child in the absence of a coherent account of
rights.
By moving our rights talk away from notions of capacity and towards conceptions of power, we may find it easier to reconceptualize a
paradigm of lawyering. From within a coherent account of rights, it is
the powerlessness of the individual, rather than her capacity to make
an intelligent or reasoned decision, that is determinative of her status
as a rights holder. Moreover, the rights of the powerless do not pro336. VentreU, supra note 5, at 259.
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mote their dependent status. Consequently, lawyering paradigms that
turn on the competency of the decision maker cannot adequately account for those individuals who may lack the requisite capabilities.
But if rights flow to the powerless, then a lawyering paradigm that
facilitates the recognition of the rights of the marginalized has
coherence.
From this perspective, client empowerment is the central value of a
lawyering model. The lawyer must recognize that existing legal structures, as well as the attorney-client relationship itself, may disempower the client. By freeing the client from subordinating
lawyering practices, the attorney enhances the client's participation in
the lawyer-client relationship. The attorney has an ethical obligation
to ensure that the client has the power to make decisions about her
case and to determine the true objectives of her representation.
Moreover, client empowerment encourages a more meaningful expression of the client's goals and may foster a true collaboration with
the lawyer.
This approach to lawyering also permits the attorney to challenge
dominant visions of her client's abilities. For example, claims by powerful elites that an individual lacks rights holder status because of her
incompetencies should be viewed skeptically. By seeing relationships
in terms of dominance and subordination, however, a coherent account of rights may reveal the ways in which powerful elites oppress
and marginalize. Rights, therefore, have value because they allow
challenges to these hierarchies and force these elites to hear the claims
of those without power. The advantage of seeing rights in this way is
to recognize the rights claims of all those, including children, who
have been oppressed.
The lawyer for the child, therefore, must be aware of the ways in
which she, as an adult, may dominate her child client. Because children are powerless, they do not expect adults to treat them with respect or to listen to their opinions. They are treated as passive and
subordinate beings who must follow the instructions of an older and
wiser adult. The lawyer, therefore, must be cognizant of the effect she
may have on her client and must take steps to facilitate the client's
empowerment in the relationship. By acknowledging that the association between attorney and child is an unequal power relationship, the
lawyer begins the process of client empowerment.
Interviewing and counseling are effective mechanisms for facilitating the child client's full participation in both the legal system and the
attorney-client relationship. From this perspective, the lawyer has an
ethical obligation to meet with the client and discover information
about the client's situation. The lawyer also has an obligation to foster communication between the lawyer and the child and to utilize
whatever techniques may be necessary to accommodate the child client. While some of these methods may account for the child's varia-
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ble linguistic and cognitive capacities, they nevertheless serve to free
the child from potential domination by the adult lawyer. Moreover,
by empowering the child in the attorney-client relationship, the lawyer
also enhances the child's ability to participate in the legal system.
Counseling methodologies also need to be sensitive to the disempowering effects of the attorney-client relationship. Manipulative
and deceptive practices subordinate the client and have no place in a
lawyering model which promotes client empowerment. The lawyer
should be particularly careful to avoid the imposition of her own views
as to what she thinks is best for the client and to empower the client to
make her own decisions. This sort of counseling is premised upon a
deep respect for the client as a rights holder and the ethics of promoting the client's status in the face of domination. Additionally, because
the goal of counseling is to facilitate the client's decision making, it is
focussed not on the correctness of the decision made but on the process by which the client reaches her decision.
To put it another way, the point of client empowerment is not to
make sure that the child client has made a good decision or the best
choice; nor is it to ensure that the way in which she reached her decision is a reasoned one. Rather, by empowering the client, the lawyer
ensures that the child, and no other, has truly made her own choice.
Of course, this may mean that some decisions will be made by the
child that the lawyer believes are wrong or ill-conceived, but then, all
clients, not just those of a certain age, are capable of making and have
made bad choices. Nevertheless there is value in allowing a client to
speak in her own voice and to determine her own goals. This is the
essence of empowerment and of ethical lawyering.
CONCLUSION

Our rights tradition, which emphasizes competency, perpetuates hierarchy by excluding those from the class of rights holders who lack
the requisite capacity. For children, who are seen as immature and
incompetent beings incapable of making important decisions about
their lives, this vision of rights has made it extremely difficult for them
to claim they have rights. Moreover, even when children have certain
interests deemed worthy of protection by the state, those interests invariably perpetuate their subordination and oppression. This sort of
rights talk also disadvantages children by structuring lawyering models that cannot accommodate the child as client. Consequently, our
lawyering paradigms rest on an impoverished account of rights.
But if we reconstruct our rights talk to account for the powerless,
we may reconsider our approaches to lawyering. If rights have value
because they challenge hierarchy and mitigate oppression, then our
rights accounts must accommodate those who have been excluded. A
coherent rights theory must account for power and powerlessness and
a coherent right empowers those who have been subordinated. Under
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this account, children are rights holders who may make rights claims
that will be recognized and treated seriously. Furthermore, this account of rights directly challenges images of children as dependent
and vulnerable and may reduce the opportunities for their
victimization.
Rethinking rights also permits us to reconsider the ways in which
we approach lawyering. Recognizing powerlessness accords rights status and structures the obligations we owe to our clients as lawyers. In
addition, by thinking about the powerlessness of our clients, we become more aware of the ways in which we, as lawyers, may dominate,
oppress, and manipulate them. Interviewing and counseling techniques are critical to client empowerment, no less so when they are
used with the child client. Moreover, these methods may ensure that
the child's voice is heard by those who have been unwilling to listen.

